How to Do Philosophy (opens in new tab)

Plato is the stuffed shirt know-it-all, and Diogenes is the smart-alecky devil's advocate ready to poke holes in Plato's ideas, thereby cutting him down a few notches: http://faculty.quinnipiac.edu/libraries/tballard/diogenes.ht... and http://members.optushome.com.au/davidquinn000/Diogenes%20Fol...

Ultimately, Diogenes is more important.

For anyone interested, I have a site http://www.ImportanceOfPhilosophy.com that explains why I think philosophy is so important and which is mainly based on Ayn Rand's philosophy.

1. I'm actually very surprised at how many Ayn Rand fans there are on this site. For a fringe philosophy that has fewer followers than Scientology there seems to be an unusually high concentration here. I am a big Ayn Rand fan, so this is a pleasant surprise for me.

2. Ayn Rand's book Intorduction to Objectivist Epistemology is the most interesting book on the theory of concept formation I've read. I have not come across anything that I found more plausible. One of the most appealing parts of it was that she tied concept formation to a similar process as algebra.

Specifically to the point of this article, I would certainly say that it changes the way you think. The chapters on definitions and concept hierarchy make your thinking radically more efficient. Even if you're a programmer and have no interest in philosophy I'd say it's definitely worth a read.

Software is applied philosophy. Where else can you deal with everything that western philosophy offers, from classification to epistemology to the philosophy of language and science -- and at the end of the day produce something that has immediate value for someone? All of this working, real-world stuff we're doing, from heuristics to machine learning and meta-programming -- it's all applied philosophy.

There's also the pragmatic tradition, as DanielBMarkham notes. I'm less familiar with it, but many have seen commonalities between Heidegger and the Pragmatists.

Ayn Rand's writing can be inspirational, but her philosophy was poorly conceived.

Philosophy of science is different from classical philosophy in that it focuses on more concrete aspects. One of the best classes I took was the philosophy of artificial intelligence. We discussed what it is to be conscious, and how we differed from a computer, it at all.

Other classes focused on the history of evolution or relativity and studied how these theories were formed and the arguments from the scientific community against them. While a lot of the readings are books or essays by people simply giving their opinions, I've learned to consider what they have to say, but that it is OK and in fact encouraged to disagree and give your own opinion. Since philosophy cannot be "proven" like a mathematical proof, another's opinions are not any more correct than my own as long as both are formed logically.

What I took from philosophy was not the opinions of the "great philosophers", but rather was the ability to think about things logically and confidently make my own opinions on them.

I can't figure out what the second sentence is trying to tell me. That societies' motivations for inventing cosmologies are their motivations for inventing cosmologies? And what does this have to do with writing in verse rather than prose?

I agree that one test of it is whether it changes the way you do things -- or at least gives you an imperative to do so that you're too weak or cowardly to heed (see Nietzche, Thoreau, Schopenhauer, Seneca).

But I dunno -- the whole math versus the world mentality always strikes me as a symptom of too much craving for certainty. Math never told us anything about the rights of man.

Few were sufficiently correct that people have forgotten who discovered what they discovered.

We are not cells and molecules. We are souls. Strange that an essay that talks about philosophy doesn't have even once the word soul.

Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotel seperates animals from humans as beings that have soul and the ability to think.

His work "Physics" tried to capture concepts people ignore even these days, and tried to examine in an amazing use of reason various metaphysical phenomena trying to find balance between whats real, fake and imaginary.

If you read the works of Aristotel and others, in original Greek you will be amazed by his astonishing ability to convey truth in a wonderful ingenious word of speech.

--

Plato talked about many not-connected subjects in a very indirect way to put the reader in becoming part of his works. Ingenius!

A very important concept of Socrates and Plato is the world of ideas. A seperate existance/entity/world that we all have access to. Modern science doesn't accept that, as there is not proof for that. But doesn't the fact that a lot of people share similar ideas at different place and time may be a small clue of exactly that?

What meanings? I think that math is made of structure, not meaning. The latter is a human phenomenon. For example, a proof using geometry and one using algebra might be mathematically identical, but have different meanings (created when they are perceived).

[This is a multi-part post. Read it before I'm killed from the site! :P Search for Metaesthesia to find the other parts.]

Bandwidth?

Yeah. If you have a connection as dense (or more) as your hemispheres have with each other, you can get some pretty strong integration, to the point the two selves dissolve into a new one. With a narrower link, like the one you have with your feet, each brain will still metafeel mostly autonomously, with a small window of empathy and ultra fast communication to the other end.

How would brains make sense of each other, if the wiring in each of us is unique?

Just as we make sense of the world in general: by rewiring until it 'works'. It would take some time until each brain makes sense of the other, and in the case of hardcore brain mergers, it would take some more time until some supra-consciousness emerges from both.

For low bandwidth-- if this technology became casual enough, conventional wirings could emerge. As we try more peer brains, our own brains pick patterns and get better at negotiating this kind of stuff. I don't rule out computer assisted training either. This would allow good old neural rigging.

In the case of high-bandwidth brain merges, would the emerging new consciousness replace both original consciousnesses?

I think it depends mainly on bandwidth. Time and plasticity of the brain also matter. If you merge brains in unborn children, I'm pretty sure they'll grow to have an unified consciousness. The older the subjects are, the longer it will take, in principle, to dissolve the old selves. But we have to assume that there is some medical way to stimulate and assist brain rewiring. It's part of the required technology, lest both brains go nuts before they can integrate.

But do you see both the original selves and the supra-self coexisting at some point?

The rewiring takes time. It doesn't just click and voila, you're merged. It's more of a cross-fade.

Do they metafeel each other?

Yes, but not necessarily in any meaningful way. Most of the time it will feel like a terrible LSD trip.

If my city metafeels, why doesn't it talk to me?

Why don't I talk to my mythocondria?

I bet you do.

That was uncalled for.

Let's continue this in private, shall we?

Sure, my email is in my profile.

[And thus, there is no Metaesthesia (4/x).]

 -  -  -

I have been reflecting along the same lines for a while, here are few thoughts, if anyone is interested.

Philosophy is constructed from two words and could be translated literarily from Greek as: love of knowledge. This implies a "lover", and from this individuality in the act I see flowing a lot of the problems you describe.

From my understanding, Wittgenstein main point is: "meaning is usage". This is a generalization that is a centrality of philosophy itself; Russell alludes to it in "the problems with philosophy" as he sets the reader on a quest to right something that can't be.

Here's my reasoning: since no two person can use a word in exactly the same way, the inherent imprecision of language and of philosophy as a construction is a feature not a bug, a v.useful one still; ever had this epiphany moment of having a great idea because you misunderstood someone?

If you set off to generalize enough on practical philosophy, I guess you get to the wisdom expressed in sayings and in illustrations; they convey by high bandwidth a particular pattern of analysis from one individual to another one that seeks wisdom, but one would be hard pressed to call receiving (as in "idee recues") sayings as a philosophical endeavor.

The way I now see philosophy is it's a quest to a personal worldview acquired through a personal love for knowledge. It cannot be exact nor absolutely true unless you're a dictator or a cult leader. This is why the idea and "ideators" are so closely associated; people talk about A.Rand because through her constructed world view she gives an ethic that have seducing finalities; however as you point out, objectivism as she conceived it cannot be perceived again by a human being let alone brought to new heights.

I find that reading inherently imprecise philosophical material can give very strong insights exactly because of the words are soft, and impact each unique individual in a different way. The ones that are not purposefully unreadable that is (Foucault?), in this I agree with you. "I", as my existing uniquely individual self, personally agree with you; another unique entity that defines itself as an ensemble of cells and electric currents. Seriously, I find it rather unconvincing that because you cannot pinpoint self, or soul, you negate something as evident as individuality, from which "I" choses to defines itself. I guess this fits "l'air du temps", ref Dawkins, Pinker and co. It has the smell of groupthink tho.

 (BTW, evilmonkey your comment got me ROTFL)

The only reason for Darwinism still to exist is because of the atheists. But atheists are extreme - an intelligent human should leave the question open, and not stupidly deny something nobody can really know by reasoning (since God is transcendent by definition).

1. Aristotle's Metaphysics, and the like, had no effect on its readers. I'd also like a clearer definition of "did something." I.e. does changing the way one thinks about practically theoretical fields "do something?"

2. No one challenged the two until the 1600s. Kant, by himself, isn't a good source since his philosophical agenda was to overthrow the relevance of religion (which was tightly coupled with classical thought). See Allan Bloom's Closing of the American Mind for details.

For my undergrad I studied the classics, and I'd say your generalizations are too general. People, such as Aristophanes, said the same things about Plato in his day that you say in your essay. Yet, generations of great thinkers have chosen Plato over the Cynics and Epicureans, today's relativists and materialists. Your critique of the uselessness of philosophy is more indicative of the fact that many of the humanities in academia today are purposely biased towards relativism or materialism.

While I agree that philosophy should be tested with practice, I don't think practicality should restrict inquiry. Otherwise, we become very short sighted. Math is a great example of this, which you've pointed out in one of your essays.

Finally, you misunderstand Aristotle's support for 'useless' theory. You're confusing 'useless' with 'pointless.' All useful activities are done for a specific goal, they aren't important in themselves. Therefore, the ultimate point of useful activities is by definition 'useless.' Aristotle thinks the final goal we all aim for is happiness, and the highest form of happiness is a kind of knowledge.

Whew, I'm glad I just watched Star Trek to learn this, and didn't spend tens of thousands at Harvard. (I'm referring to the numerous times someone was 'duplicated' in a transporter accident)

As a hill-climbing algorithm, wouldn't this approach tend to result in the local optimum rather than the most general truths?

Sampling from what -- "meaning-space"?

1. Just as it can be useful to be able to consider what makes a _good_ burrito, it can be useful to consider what makes a _tortilla_ (as opposed to pita or lavash or other flat breads). A large part of metaphysics is about carving up and categorising concepts and analysing and clarifying distinctions. These skills (taken in moderation) turn out to be quite useful in everyday life.

2. Symbolic logic is great exercise for the brain. Analytic philosophy is great for learning to write precisely. Becoming a better thinker and writer will serve you well. (Philosophy is a good way to get these skills, but not the only way.)

3. Philosophy is the subject which encompasses studies that are not yet mature enough to be their own disciplines. Some such subjects may never mature, but others will (think Kuhnian protoscience, iff you like Kuhn). Most maths and sciences have spun off from philosophy. The boundaries are fascinating: go read the so-called natural philosophers (the term "scientists" is anachronistic) like Descartes, Galileo, Huygens, Newton, and Leibniz.

4. There's a wealth of "philosophy of $foo" subjects to study. The degree of BS involved in Phil($foo) seems proportional to the degree of BS in $foo. Pick the right $foo, and study _both_ $foo and Phil($foo), and you've likely found someting meaningful to study.

I have no stake in this matter except an intellectual one. It's quite saddening for me to see yet another formal student of philosophy produce such a boring, typical, and downright naive treatise on the subject, a writer who has chosen to convert into assertions of half-truths a thinly veiled myopia.

If this is the sort of intellectual cynicism that the modern institution produces, then I am quite happy that I've had no part in it.

And why on earth is there no mention of the Americans? Is that once burdgeoning and scientifically literate pragmatist tradition completely lost to us? Why are we still dwelling on the befuddled analytic solution to continental problems when such great American minds as Charles Sanders Pierce have made such sharpening new developments without precociously discarding the old? And their writing is as far as anything out there from being mealy-mouthed or inexact.

I'm sorry, but we can do a hell of a lot better than this. And we ought to; our current level of science demands it.

A good example of this is the phenomenon of prodigies. We know there are some people in society who are exceptionally talented in certain areas, and we call these people prodigies. We then have certain schemas that we apply to these prodigies in our quest for wisdom.

But even though prodigies clearly exist, our schemas often seem to not hold up so well. For example, studies have shown that child prodigies are often not significantly more successful than the rest of us when they grow up. And similarly, many prodigious adults were completely unremarkable as children. Why is this? How is it possible for such exceptional children not to make anything of themselves, and for such exceptional adults to have been completely average as children?

Malcolm Gladwell observes that the reason for this is because when we describe child prodigies, we are describing people who are gifted at learning. Whereas when we describe adult prodigies, we are actually describing people are gifted at doing.

Because we are applying one set of sensemaking tools to both groups, our schemas tend to not hold up so well even though they are based on an underlying truth. The solution to this is to create one set of schemas for understanding and dealing with child prodigies, and another set of schemas for understanding and dealing with adult prodigies.

There are often areas where we engage in fuzzy thinking, and apply one toolset to multiple distinct phenomena. Philosophers and thinkers can create enormous value by identifying distinct phenomena, and giving suggestions for how to think about each one.

PG actually does this in his essay How to Make Wealth. He observes that money and wealth are not the same thing so we should think about them differently. Specifically, that money is sort of an abstraction of wealth, but for various reasons we can benefit from thinking about wealth on a lower level. Providing the sort of disambiguation that this essay does is really valuable, which is why this is arguably the most useful of all the PG essays.

It seems like with math we start with something we know is true but not necessarily useful (like just the concept of a line) and then we abstract our way to usefulness. This is opposed to philosophy, which generally takes the stance that all models are false but some models are useful. In philosophy we usually start with something that is useful in certain situations but not necessarily universally true, and then we disambiguate our way down toward truthfulness. I don't really see a problem with philosophy as long as it is empirically useful under at least in certain conditions.

I feel there are two major issues with philosophy today:

1. No "philosophical method" the same way there is a scientific method, which means philosophy doesn't really build on each other from one philosopher to the next.

2. No real way to categorize ideas the same way you can categorize physics research, which makes it hard to find prior art. So even though Malcolm Gladwell and PG make really good arguments, there is no guarantee that people in the future will use these arguments. As opposed to science where is something is proven true it becomes the basis for future works.

I'm afraid of such detached situations, and so I'm trying to get highest possible abstraction of source code taking into account current programming environment / developers mental world. Each small abtraction step, which I'm achieving is one step forward - I can identify of what was done correctly and what was done wrong and take into consideration on making the next step. Unfortunately the further I go - more resistance I feel is hitting me back.

For example programming language compilers are made by whole teams, and architecture and design - even if they exists require enormous effort to develop similar compiler.

I however still think there is a way to simplify things, but it's very hard to find a better way / solution, as it is probably with philosophy. I'm inspired by language like Toki Pona, and that what drives me forward.

Unfortunately this does not follow. In most cases, if you lose half your brain you would die. If by chance, after losing half your brain you continue to live, that means the physical half that is gone was the less essential part. I am not a neurologist but I'd guess it is very unlikely that if you lost the part that survived you could still live.

Regards,

Atakan Gurkan

So PG's a pretty useful philosopher, at least according to his own test: "The test of utility I propose is whether we cause people who read what we've written to do anything differently afterward." Good stuff, PG.

In the last 3 years, however, I've picked up some great philosophy CDs from The Teaching Company. I spent 400 bucks instead of all that tuition, and I learned enough philosophy to really appreciate it.

I agree somewhat and disagree somewhat with Paul's essay. On one hand, pragmatism seems to be the only rational resposne to so much generalizing! And he's right -- philosopher's have continuously pushed the boundaries of language well past the breaking point.

But I think Paul overgeneralizes, which is ironic since that seems to be part of the claim he's making against philosophy. I view the field as really smart people trying to come to grasp ultimate truths on which the rest of science can be constructed. Many times they have succeede, like J.S. Mills, or Newton. Philosophy generates science.

But you can't take it too seriously. Philosophy is like a dance, or a way to play the tuba. If you're having fun with it, and you're generating something of value (I would agree with the life-changing criteria but simply making a buck from geralizing where nobody else did is enough for me) then you're a philosopher. Anybody who's ever sat designing a program where you get that "a ha!" moment, where you realize by generalizing in these few areas you've made a whole new practical and valuable thing, is right up there with Russell in my book. Anybody who has went through requirements sessions, only to have the code still not match the needs because of the slipperiness of language understands Wittgenstein.

Natural philosophy is a very good name for science, because it reminds us that "science" is based on a philosophy. This philosophy includes the concepts of control of degrees of freedom, replication of process and result as the axiom for "proof", and objectivity, among other things.

As an example, math is not science, it is a sub-class of philosophy. It is important to realize that the math used in science is fully in tune with the philosophy of science, and MUST BE in order to be a valid tool in scientific inquiry.

Philosophy, properly done, is a way of helping both group and differentiate (to classify) things. A fundamental difference, for example, is between the constructed experiential (such as a belief), and something that is physical and non-experiential (the atomic weight of iron). This difference, properly understood, is one of the beneficial results of studying philosophy, and it HAS changed the world.

One note about modern philosophy, though. One of my cofounders enjoys reading about neuroscience, and I was talking to him about modern philosophy a few months ago. He suggested, quite wisely, that in a few hundred years, the early 21st century work that philosophers read is as likely to come from science-oriented guys like Steven Pinker and Daniel Dennett (i.e. the meaningoflife.tv cohort) as it is from traditional philosophers.

PG's redefinition of philosophy is something I've been thinking/writing about a bit recently. I prefer to call it insight, and I don't think its worth trying to define by itself. Insight is the abstract thinking that gets to the heart of a real problem or class of problems, it by definition illuminates our understanding. Calling it philosophy will just cause everyone who attempts it to miss the point. Plus philosophy has a history and a workforce, all of which will completely derail any attempt to redefine the field.

Is this not an example, from within the mainstream of philosophy, of the thing you're calling for?

I've written some poetry in my time, and I've read enough of it too, to know that verse can be even more precise than prose -- but it is generally less tentative, mainly because it takes more effort and thought _per_word_ to write poetry. Verse is crafted; prose tumbles out of discussion.

One can imagine Plato or Aristotle stumbling back home after a long night of drinking and talking philosophy, and then quickly jotting down a particularly juicy discussion in prose. However, good poetry (especially when it's highly philosophical) tends to require a lot of thought, and it tends to come from individual reflection. Wordsworth's "Daffodils" talks about this:

For oft, when on my couch I lie In vacant or in pensive mood, They flash upon that inward eye Which is the bliss of solitude; And then my heart with pleasure fills, And dances with the daffodils.

Poetry comes out of individual reflection, and usually not directly from a discussion. However, the classical Greek philosophers produced philosophy by discussion -- hence the "Socratic method."

Verse is no more or less suited to philosophy than prose, but the classical Greeks preferred prose, because it reflected their approach to philosophy.

Ironically, especially nowadays, prose cloaks philosophy in a garb of officialness. Prose claims precision through official-sounding vocabulary and structure; poetry _exhibits_ precision through careful choice of sound, word, image, and structure.

mfh http://hilbertastronaut.blogspot.com/

[This was meant as a reply to a comment about soul, but I drifted too bad to claim it's really a reply to anything.]

The word 'soul' has a lot of baggage I don't care for, but I need some word that expresses the concept of 'feeling', 'perception', 'consciousness' in me. Not my ability to perceive this or that, to feel this or that, but the quality of experiencing stuff at all. Just to get rid of some of the implications of the words above, I could call this feeling of self autoesthesia, or, for an even more pretentious neologism, metaesthesia. I'll conjure a ridiculous, but convenient, word for the act of exercising metaesthesia: metafeeling.

Note that in the paragraph above I have talked about myself rather than about humans as a species. This is for several crucial reasons. To confront the thorny one first: quite honestly, I haven't established yet that any of you guys have this.

No offense; most of you folks look convincing enough, especially when I only have myself to compare to. In any event, I have to say most of you other people are quite alright phenomenons to perceive. I hope we can still continue this discussion in civilized terms[1].

But I'm trying to be rigorous here (heh..), and for all I know, you could all be replicants, NPCs, or hallucinations. I can only metafeel my own stuff!

Another reason why I didn't speak of 'us' is, who are us? What is not us? As soon as I go happily assuming metaesthesia in other stuff, I have no good reason to limit myself to humans, animals, living beings, computational systems, complex systems, material things, or whatever else, if anything, is there.

Do my cells metafeel? Do the mitochondria within them? Do cities, societies? Does the world as a whole, does the universe as a whole have a definite consciousness that metafeels itself?

[I had to split this. Search in page for "Metaesthesia (2/3)"]

"Meta" - you can ask the set of questions "what can we say about claims about X?"

"Anti-meta" - you can ask the questions "what can X say about other things?" (make X a meta-concept of some other concept)

"General" - you can ask the question "do there exist generalizations of X?" (commonly known as abstraction, although the term is ambiguous - generalization is more precise)

"Specific" - you can ask the question "do there exist instances of X?"

Answering questions in these 4 directions gives you information about what you really want to know - what is X? What is "true" of X?

Philosophy is exploration and characterization of this "idea space." Nothing more. Nothing less. Very useful, if people would only do it once in a while.

---

Quick example:

"What is free-will?" = X

Meta:

Does free-will correspond to a thing? What classes of things is it in? What are our intuitions? What can we meaningfully say about free-will?

Anti-meta:

Suppose we define free-will well. What concepts does it enable? Are those concepts meaningful?

General:

Are there generalizations of free-will? How about just plain old "will"? What can we say about "will"? How about "freedom?" What's that?

Specific:

Are there any hard-and fast examples of free will? Are there any "thought-experiments" we can perform to try to shake out our intuitions? For instance, if everything were systematic/deterministic, what would this imply?

---

My claim is that this method is useful for getting terms to be well-defined in the way that PG requires of math. You just keep doing this sort of analysis over and over until you get down to essential definitions.

Best to start from the bottom, though.

Like you, I studied philosophy in college, and then ended up in the tech industry. I've tried really hard to repress my philosophical urges because when I express their questions, I get into trouble.

I've had managers in the tech industry tell me to quit it with the philosophy, and I used to think there was something wrong with me for being philosophical.

If you look at Socrates, he was killed for his philosophizing. If philosophy is really as you, and the early Wittgenstein say it is, then why do people get so upset about philosophy?

I think (like Plato and Socrates) it's because the questioning in philosophy puts people face to face with their ignorance. And most people if they've had some success in life, like to believe it's because they know.

You wrote: "The real lesson here is that the concepts we use in everyday life are fuzzy, and break down if pushed too hard."

You've clearly identified the source of upset people have at philosophy. But what if the concept is really broken and doesn't fit the world it was born into? Ptolemaic physics is pretty fuzzy. Many have pushed it too hard. Does that mean we should kill someone?

You might be disillusioned in philosophy, but I find it liberating. What makes me fear for the future, especially since now, the study of philosophy in terms of student enrollments has doubled, is that people will suppress it.

Also, they often focus on superficial behaviors instead of underlying thinking patterns. For instance, here's a way of thinking that I've found to be useful: 99% of the time, there's no logical reason to feel fear in any social situation. Whatever happens, when all is said and done, it really doesn't matter what other people think of you. If that seems like a "no-duh" way of thinking to you, think back to when you were in high school.

A superficial example of this behavior is learning to meet new people. But someone who hasn't grasped the underlying concept will have a hard time meeting people, no matter how often they read about how to meet people on personal development blogs.

Besides money, another reason for this personal development blog bullshit is that a lot of the bloggers are themselves in the process of figuring out how to be successful, etc. It's much easier to write instructions for someone else than yourself, so they start blogging about what they think will work for them without necessarily having tried it for very long. Thus the field of personal development can be something like an echo chamber, where the same ideas are repeated over and over.

http://www.bahai-library.org/personal/jw/other.pubs/nagarjun...

(This is where the Great Middle Way comes from: the middle way between existence and non-existence. We can prove Berkeley wrong just by kicking stone: it would be wrong to assert that that the phenomena don't exist in the casual, everyday sense. However, they don't exist in that sense that if we look deep into it the entity we casually define as a "stone" does not actually have a true and lasting essence, or identity.)

2. However, I believe philosophy, even though usually it is a bluff, is a necessary evil. How can we talk about politics without philosophy? How can one have any political opinion without at least having some ideas of what "good", esp. "a good life" is? (OK you can be an anarcho-capitalist without it but otherwise basically both Liberalism and Conservativism requires some definition of "good".)

Miklos Hollender

We make art supplies in order to make art. We make art because we like art. Aristotle pursued knowledge, not because he wanted to use it, but because he valued it for its own sake; much like a hacker will write a program, not so that he can do his taxes with it or watch really cool videos, so much as because he enjoys the craft. This attitude, that knowledge is not just a means to and end but rather an end in and of itself, today is usually called 'curiosity.'

I think the lesson here is that people who aren't curious about the questions that philosophy attempts to answer probably shouldn't study it to any great deal. It's just like people who don't like to program shouldn't become programmers; they won't get anything out of it.

It amazes me every now and then how smart people can get lost. I have and I'm not that smart. But I am smart enough to know that many of the attempted arguments in this essay are off.

Consolidating the history of a field of thought to a few authors and blaming one of the "fathers" as making a mistake is a false argument. It doesn't address the core framework of the field or address applied thinking. Philosophy is about logic and understanding how to get to a point where one human can explain to another in clear terms what that means.

I enjoy Mr. Graham's articles and read all of them, in this case I would avoid reading this and instead read Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance instead.

Many useful studies started out as branches of philosophy. As a topic develops standards of evidence, it tends to calve off from philosophy. So natural philosophy turned into physics, biology, astronomy, etc. as practitioners got serious about observation and modeling. Likewise, logic and geometry grew into mathematics, parts of epistemology turned into psychology, and social theory is turning into social science. Today psychologists and evolutionary theorists are starting to take a fresh look at questions in ethics and aesthetics.

What's left in the philosophy department, then, are topics that have been hard, so far, to get purchase on. If you focus on these topics, you can get a feeling of futility, but it's like staring at the bare patch in an otherwise fertile garden.

There’s an author, A. H. Almaas, that has articulated a way of inquiry that is quite penetrating in its quality. He became a physics student because he wanted to know reality. At some point his love of knowing reality turned a corner towards the human condition, and a way of inquiring into human existence gradually became clear to him. So he uses this way of inquiry to help people investigate their experience. And this has the effect of revealing the nature of their existence.

So he and his students use inquiry for inner knowing, but it could also be used in any field of study. And he says as much in his book “Spacecruiser Inquiry” (page 372). Turns out inquiry is a general truth, broadly applicable like Paul’s examples of the controlled experiment and evolution. And when Almaas turned inquiry towards inquiry itself, the basic elements of inquiry became clear: ordinary knowledge, basic knowledge, not-knowing, dynamic questioning, loving the truth, the personal thread, and journey without a goal (chapters 5 through 11). When all these elements are in place, inquiry can be quite effective and efficient, no matter where used.

So to get back to Paul’s essay, I think he’s onto something when he suggests to start with something very specific and then to follow it to something more general. Following the thread of a small, specific experience or observation can lead with inquiry, persistence, and time to larger and more general truths. This is real philosophy. Starting with someone else’s large truths and commenting and speculating on them and adding a few of your own will not do much to add to our understanding of reality or to develop new, useful knowledge and things.

I'm glad to finally see an explanation for the letdown I experienced as an enthusiastic but inexperienced scholar. I remember when I asked my first philosophy professor, someone I had struggled with intellectually (and physically during a dinner party) for a recommendation letter to leave philosophy and study law, and his reply that I had "not spent enough time with the classics" for him to feel confident that I was a real enough philosopher.

I am glad now to state that I am not, and that like many my response to its flaws was to turn to other pursuits.

In his book, Wittgenstein said that one must be silent on those things about which one cannot speak. The idea as advanced in his lecture on ethics is that some things simply cannot be expressed in human language and one should not try to speak about them. But is there really any harm in trying?

Anything useful that came out of philosophy is called something else: mathematics, science, etc. It has not failed. We should keep on trying.

[This follows from anoter post in this page. Search for Metaesthesia (1/3) if interested.]

In the interest of agility, I'll go one level deeper into insanity and present the rest of my drivel as an interview with myself:

How can things metafeel if they don't have nervous systems, or any mechanism for reacting to their environments?

Well, they can have very peaceful feelings. I know where you're coming from: I can relate my feelings to the flow of information through my nervous system. I can see how different conditions that alter the quality of that flow alter the quality of my feelings similarly. Extrapolating, I'd say that feeling emerges somehow from complex order.

Ha! Typical nervous system chauvinism.

(sigh) What's a neural network to do?

No, really. Why are my metafeelings bound to my physical body? If everything metafeels, why don't I metafeel everything? Why this fragmentation?

I imagine there is some I that emerges from the interactions of my body with other entities. My matter, my actions serve that consciousness too, although I am a less significant part of it. Just as most of my cells are replaced often (and thus, I presume, their tiny consciousnesses are born and die), while my perceived self stays mostly constant.

So what if half my brain was transplanted to other body?

I hope you'll go on the other half.

No, seriously: after some initial weirdness and confusion, it will be business as usual. The other body will be a different person. A very affine person, to be sure. Maybe like someone you've spent all your life with and told all your secrets to, probably someone you'll care a lot about. But I bet you can get something similar without surgery, if you were willing to go all the way to get that level of intimacy with someone. It's scary and it wouldn't be easy to know yourself well enough, nor it would be easy for the other person to understand you well enough, but I bet some approximation is possible by good old interpersonal communication means.

So what about the converse? Could it be possible to merge consciousnesses by merging nervous systems?

I bet. That would be an even more interesting experiment. For maybe different degrees of metaesthetical merging, you could link brains temporarily or permanently, and you could do it with more or less bandwidth.

[Continued in Metaesthesia (3/3), which search for.]

http://sriramanamaharshi.org/

Happiness All beings desire happiness. Everybody loves himself best. The cause for this love is only happiness. So, that happiness must lie in one self. Further, that happiness is daily experienced by everyone in sleep, when there is no mind. To attain that natural happiness one must know oneself. For that, Self-Enquiry 'Who am I?' is the chief means.

prakash@kinet1.com

I would love to know your take on the subject.

You talk about the "meaning of words" in a very English school way. Obviously the meaning of meaning is the branch where Wittgenstein left the British for dead and led to Heidegger and Derrida. Meaning of meaning is an important issue as we begin the task of programming computers that will be more intelligent than we are.

Craig A. Eddy - I am, therefore I think, I am perceived, and I have the ability to feel angst. One should always start with what one knows.

Craig A. Eddy, B.A. Philosophy (which is to say a Bachelor of Arts degree in BS)

Also, that statement that "all previous philosophy is bollocks" is a literary device used by numerous philosophers.

Who is the master who makes the grass green?

Beliefs, or articles of faith, may be defined as intrinsically untestable assertions. Under that assumption, people can and should feel at liberty to maintain whatever beliefs they like. Their beliefs need be of no concern to anyone else, as they can never have any consequences. For if a belief had definite consequences, it would be testable, contrary to our assumed definition.

As an example, suppose I assert a belief that the world was created 6,000 years ago, and that God at that time laid down the fossil record and all the related evidence which has made scientists believe in geological history and biological evolution. My belief should bother no one, as it is untestable and has no observable consequences.

Continuing the example, if I later throw a stone at a scientist who fails to share my belief, that action of mine must stand on its own. It cannot be ascribed to my belief. "I believed that I must..." is rightly not an acceptable argument in any court.

[branch of philosophy]: [equiv. branch of science] without a laboratory.

I'm not sure philosophy can really be improved beyond the obvious: ie, introducing experimentation after the theorization. But then it's no longer philosophy.

jb

For the longest time I kept asking my friends "how can you prove to me THAT tree is in fact a tree?" It was all part of realizing that current philosophy is just a play on words. I do believe that once you understand that, you can think beyond the frivolous debates.

Metaphysics: What is true, without exceptions, about things that are not physical or on the boundary of being physical. Ontology: What is true, without exceptions, about existence (being) Epistemology: What is true, without exceptions, about how you know what you know Ethics: What is true about the way things ought to be, without exceptions.

Epistemology/Ontology/Metaphysics have provided lots of value for those that love truth without exceptions.

If you read philosophers and try to see the problems they want to solve within those branches of philosophy, ask yourself what are the exceptions. When you try to battle with them, you will have the feeling of thinking you are the first one to climb a large mountain, only to find a whole city at the top with a lot of people saying, 'What took you so long to get here? PS here are the real mountains for you to climb!'

Is there anything that is true (epistemology)? If false, why have an essay? If true, what is it?

A simple start, can a self refuting statement be true? Well the vast majority of philosophers would tell you no. That is to say they would believe the following statement to be true:

1) Self refuting statements are false or inscrutable.

So you have plenty of people in the world that deny (1). Philosophy allows the Descarte types to relax when dealing with these people.

So lets take a Descarte truth based on (1). That would be:

2) I cannot doubt doubting.

Or in other words I do not have the ability to doubt my ability to doubt. Then when someone says something like this:

4) If I am multiple pieces, I do not exist (?!) 5) Empirical data has shown that I am multiple pieces (cells) 6) Therefore I do not exist

a descarte type doesn't waste brain energy on either (4) or (5) (or both).

To sum this up, philosophy is the domain of what is necessarily the case. Science (positivism) has nothing to say about this. That is what philosophy brings to the table. But only a descarte type would enjoy this.

For programmers, an analogy could be said as lisp programmers laugh at the 'pattern circus' and the 'aspect oriented design' of other languages (which basically fix what should not have been broken in the first place), philosophers laught 10X as much at people that say things like 'I don't exist' and 'there are no true statements' and wish that they could help them, but know that some people love their circus so they let them have their fun.

Philosophy, at its best, is basically a study of the history of ideas. (Let's set aside modern philosophy, especially the Continental variety, for now.) This seems no more or less practical than any other kind of history, be it military history or art history.

Let me address a few of Paul Graham's points.

First: "Few [philosophers] were sufficiently correct that people have forgotten who discovered what they discovered." This is demonstrably false. How many scientists understand their debt to Aristotle for being the first to attempt a systematic categorization of the natural world? How many people apply Ockham's Razor without knowing anything about the guy who came up with it (other than his name)? How many programmers understand their debt to G.W. Leibniz? How many Americans understand their debt to the many political philosophers (Locke comes to mind) for their system of government? I could go on and on.

Second: "Did studying logic teach me the importance of thinking [logically], or make me any better at it? I don't know." Nevermind logic specifically, but philosophy is widely regarded as an excellent pre-law major, and I know of at least one SCOTUS justice (Breyer) who studied it. Now, maybe it's possible to get the same training on one's own, but there doesn't seem to be a whole lot of evidence that philosophy is failing to train rigorously critical thinkers.

Third: "Most philosophical debates are not merely afflicted by but driven by confusions over words." Well, most philosophical debates that take place in a freshman dorm under a haze of bong smoke are. Just kidding -- sort of. So the "free will" debate has been beaten to death, and is basically a matter of semantics. Who cares? Are Nietzsche's critiques of ethics just a matter of confusion over words? I don't think so. Ditto the guys I mentioned above.

Fourth: Let's talk about Aristotle. So, Aristotle basically defined the pursuit of science for two thousand years, and it didn't go as well as it has since people decided to move beyond his paradigm. So should we treat Aristotle like a bonehead? I don't think so. I could just as easily say that all military history prior to the invention of gunpower is nothing but a catalogue of hilarious errors rendered irrelevant by the first guy who was smart enough to mix up a few simple chemicals and instantly consign all prior weapon systems to the scrap heap. How could all those hundreds of previous generations be so miserably dumb that they couldn't come up with this simple formula? They actually wasted millennia doing nothing but hitting each other with variations of the sharpened stick/rock/hunk of metal. Why should we waste our time studying them, or worse yet, appreciating them? This is nothing but "presentism."

Fifth: "And so instead of denouncing philosophy, most people who suspected it was a waste of time just studied other things. That alone is fairly damning evidence, considering philosophy's claims." So, it's damning evidence that people who suspect a subject is useless just studied something else? Isn't this true of almost all subjects that students aren't coercively forced to study? Most people who suspect astronomy is a waste of time don't study it. And indeed, I'm sure that describes most people. Is that evidence that all of astronomy is b.s.?

Furthermore, this is supposed to be damning "considering philosophy's claims [i.e., that it's] supposed to be about the ultimate truths." Who exactly made this claim? Mr. Graham attributes this claim to philosophy itself, which is a rather strange thing to do. As far as I know, this is the first time an academic discipline has literally spoken for itself, something I thought academic disciplines were not capable of doing. Does he mean that Aristotle made this claim? If so, I should point out that until long, long after Aristotle, the word "philosophy" was essentially synonymous with all study in the pursuit of knowledge, and thus would include basically every discipline taught in modern universities (except maybe some of the fine arts).

This is a straw man. Damning philosophy because it doesn't reveal the ultimate truths of the universe is like damning capitalism because it doesn't make everybody happy.

Now, it is true that "modern philosophy" finds itself with fewer and fewer useful things to talk about. Most interesting fields of study have split off into their own departments and disciplines. But most of what undergraduate philosophy departments teach their students is really the history of ideas, and that strikes me as a perfectly good and useful thing to study.

All best,

Max Menlo Park, CA.

Fundamental and central to the dissatisfaction that many people feel with philosophy is the realization that it is not formal or concrete -- that it is ultimately abstract and seems to be nothing more than 'word play' (semantics). They study "process" since that seems to be all that can be done.

The author writes: "that the concepts we use in everyday life are fuzzy, and break down if pushed too hard."

The trouble with this idea is that it hides incomplete assumptions. Concepts are defined _as_much_ in terms of continuity as in symmetry. Saying that a concept 'breaks down' in analysis is simply saying that the concept of symmetry (a logical sameness while under conditions and contexts of the applied analytic force) is not sufficient to fully contain the meaning of a concept. That is true, but not a problem. The logic of continuity is as complete in its own way as any formalisms based on symmetry. There is no paradox in this; nothing is lost, and it is right that concepts be understood in this more complete way. The /process/ of philosophy needs to be changed in a certain way, a very different kind of discipline, equally as hard, than that a mathematician would use.

For example, the "Ship of Theseus" paradox is a direct exploration of how the notion of continuity must be included in the very basis of a notion of a notion. If that were not enough evidence in this post, may I point out that it is also possible to directly construct "barber" type paradoxes that show that the notion of a concept of a particular type (ie, non-fuzzy) cannot somehow be more basic than the notion of a concept itself.

Philosophy does have a strong and irreducible core of definite knowledge -- it just does not happen to be widely known or taught in USA universities at this time. Mostly I suspect that this is because philosophy _as_a_practice_ does not have an obvious direct connection to bottom line profitability (ie, ideas like "education is about business" -- "right intelligence/information is success", etc). It is therefore treated as a 'has been' -- something for people to do in their spare time, for reasons of interest and/or hobby.

Yet the connection of philosophy to practicality is (astonishingly) far more real, powerful, and potent than 99.9% of the worlds people will ever realize, because it /also/ happens to be so completely subtle and everywhere pervasive. This means only that it will also be the most neglected, particularly in younger civilizations (as ours is).

It has been observed that when a technology is truly powerful, it also tends to be unobtrusive. In fact, some have proposed that the proper measure of the power of a technology is in its unobtrusiveness. An advanced technolgy appears as "magic" to an unknowing and primative people (A. C. Clark). Similarly, philosophy is, if anything, much more subtle than the much more basic and simpler forms of religion and contemporary politics. A Master of the Art can move entire nations with the stroke of a pen, but such people are very rare and unobtrusive themselves.

For an example of the forgoing, Consider the effect of the -- at that time very novel -- ideas of "life, liberty, and the presuit of happness" (as suggested by John Locke) on the historical development of the USA. These ideas are so central to the way that we think and define our self identity now, individially and nationally, that they are totally taken for granted. Yet indirectly, one mans philosophy shaped the course and outcome of wars, and indeed everything 300 million people do, in every practical business decision, the world over. Go just a little farther and you find that the "love philosophy" of one (presumed) man has affected billions more for far longer (2000 years).

Although stated informally, something about their ideas must somehow /feel/ true to /most/ people, regardless of context -- a definite indication that 'something is up' and should be considered carefully. Although an examination of the logical form of their philosophical assertions does not hold up using ordinary mathematical logic, something about them makes them very pervasive and influential -- a power that like any other in nature, must be somewhere connected to a real truth. A different kind of discipline is needed to discover these connections, not just a different type of domain knowledge.

Q: How is it that a handful of gurus/buddahs in ancient history can have effects so far out of proportion to the scope of their lives? A: In one form or another, they all taught philosophy that had at least some, possibly unknown, connection to a real truth of nature and life.

Q: Is philosophy practical? A: Yes. It is at once very subtle and very powerful -- nearly invisible and yet when 'right', nearly invincible. These are all notions based inherently in foundations of continuity.

Asking for philosophy to be "practical" and to "have effects" is like asking all the worlds oceans to be "wet". Why should 'wetness' be a more defining characteristic of a "good ocean" than any other? Even the question itself is connected to deeper assumed truths in philosophy.

For the record, I would like it to be known that I do also definitely agree that Sturgeon's law applies to the nearly total current state of Western philosophy. For my own part, to get anywhere with it I have had to start from scratch -- examining the root ideas and assumptions behind science and spirituality to get anywhere at all. At this point, I am glad I did because I can assert with the absolute confidence of owned rigorous proofs that 1) Kant (and others) were wrong about metaphysics, 2) that is possible (and necessary!) to positively and exactly define things like a non-relativistic ethics, and 3) that the fully self describing "auto bootstraping" system of concepts is known and does currently exist explicitly (as would be inherent in any true 'system of metaphysics'). There is nothing 'fuzzy' about a root analysis of the inherent assumptions behind all the 'fuzzy' usages of meaning in everyday languages. But do _not_ expect the sort of concepts that provide a the very basis for everyday logic to look like ordinary logic either -- different protocols of thinking are required. Continuity is as fundamental a notion as symmetry. Again for the record, I note that the basis of these ideas have absolutely no connection to religion or faith, although the net effect of them tends to validate a lot of things most world religions tend to take on faith.

Those who have the eyes to see will see; all others will be blinded or live in darkness.

Regards, Forrest Landry, Apr 19, 2008, San Deigo, CA.

"Philosophy has been misled by the example of mathematics; and even in mathematics the statement of the ultimate logical principles is beset by difficulties, as yet insuperable. The verification of a rationalistic scheme is to be sought in its general success, and not in the peculiar certainty, or initial clarity, of its first principles." "The position of metaphysics in the development of culture cannot be understood without remembering that no verbal statement is the adequate expression of a proposition."

Whitehead (who was an early collaborator of Russell's) made these statements while Wittgenstein was a schoolteacher and Russell was still enthralled with his early work, which W. himself later rejected in favour of the ideas he is now (justly) celebrated for.

Whitehead's lack of a legacy in professional philosophy is partly due to the fact that he felt it was nevertheless necessary to articulate a sort of heuristic metaphysical framework -- which few professional philosophers have been interested in tangling with [actually, it's been pretty roundly criticized; I meant that philosophers aren't interested in countering or improving it] (for reasons PG points out in the essay).

By making such an attempt, he has much in common with Heidegger, who has remained more widely read and cited than Whitehead perhaps (for another reason pointed out by PG) because of his esoteric and unclear style. It's as if James Joyce and Kurt Godel both composed universal cosmologies: whose do you think would be more popular among later generations of young philosophers?

Whitehead also agreed with PG's attitude towards Aristotle's impractical metaphysics: "Metaphysics is nothing but the description of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice."

I think PG's "test of utility" has potential, but I think we should be careful not to let it stray too far into an authoritative stance. (... while I try not to stray into "word soup.") What I mean is that, above all, we should be doing philosophy for ourselves but with others, in conversation. We may not get them to "do something differently," but if we can get them to do something with us (like discuss philosophy, as PG's essay has so effectily done here...), then we've done enough (for the moment). I think if we start believing our ideas are for other people's benefit -- that we somehow appreciate their needs and wants better than they do -- we get into hazardous situations of resentment and (ironically) competition.

My favourite "test of the value of any philosophy" (quoting John Dewey) is Dewey's question, "Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful?"

That is roughly a more general formulation of PG's test -- only without the requirement of having someone else read it -- which (correct me if I'm wrong) sort of demonstrates PG's proposal: it was useful in getting me to act differently (or at least getting me to act), which I did by "cranking up the generality" -- to apply not just to written philosophies but any kind of idea or insight. (Now we wait and see how useful my [I mean Dewey's] philosophy is...)

And I fully agree with the last comment: we're just beginning to learn.