It's extremely effective as a shield for the 125kHz LF wake-up signal, and I've been unable to elicit a response when they're in there, even with a relay setup that reliably wakes them up from several feet away otherwise.
My previous cars had keys that I could manually switch off and on, which is also not a full solution because it only works for people who take the effort to always do that, but at least it gives people to opportunity to complete prevent relay attacks.
All in all I'm not a big fan of key-less entry. Having to press a button on a key to gain entry can maybe be a bit of an annoyance, but in my opinion it's not a big deal compared to the advantage of completely preventing relay attacks.
Such common sense, yet so uncommon.
- I ain’t cut out to be Jessie James -You don’t go writing hot checks down in Mississippi - Dutch oven has a non fart meaning
The bags work while I'm in the car.
Which means you are safer with just keys rather than keys plus another way to open the doors.
> This was partially solved by adding another device that cuts off the engine, the immobilizer
If they key does not need to be physically inserted to start the engine (which is true in many cars) then that is liable to attack using the remotes too, right?
The key fob attack is superior since no one looks twice if you walk up to a car, it unlocks from a hand held device and then you get in and drive off.
<EDIT> Seems HN has different experiences with their cars then my own, So I'll concede the idea that the alarm doesn't trip when using the key. It seems the cars I've had in the past are the exception to the rule. </EDIT>
The thing is, in the real world, no one really looks twice when someone gets into a car unless they are using obvious brute force to get into the car.
And in either case you still need to deal with the immobilizer, and turn the core of the ignition lock. Unless your radio device is that comprehensive :)
I assume that this was also true for other brands.
A few hundred dollars more on Amazon will net you a magic keyring that can open a surprising number of vehicles, buildings, control systems, and vending machines.
If you're into that sort of thing check out Deviant Ollam's physical pentesting videos on Youtube.
I don't get the appeal of keyless ignition.
I personally put a very high value on having a minimal keychain and wallet since I rarely carry a bag with me. The goal is to someday live in a state with Apple Wallet drivers’ license support, in a house with NFC smart locks, driving a car with Apple Car Key, at which point I could finally completely jettison my keys and my MagSafe wallet. I don’t want to carry physical keys when I’m already constantly carrying a device with a Secure Enclave and biometrics.
Also it not being possible to lock yourself out of your car is neat.
It's not a must have but it's really nice.
Source: Canada
No you don't. Remember when Kia Boyz trended on TikTok, where cars with physical keys were so easy to steal that people were doing it just for clout, but ones with fancier keyless ignitions were safe?
Cars are not very secure by nature: they have easy to break glass windows, and are made of relatively lightweight materials. The key system just needs to match that level of security, and AFAIK, attacks on the keyfob are uncommon compared to other, less subtle techniques.
The more complex and sensitive "PKES" system, according to the article already has a challenge-response system, but it doesn't help with relay attacks.
the problem is they "improved" the usability
it was safe when you had to push a button, but now roles are flipped so the car is the initiator, and doing it constantly
the protocol is now subject to a whole entire extra class of attacks it was never designed to deal with
As for replay attacks, that's where the button press comes in (like on a hardware security token) -- the key only responds to challenges within a second or so of a button press and the car sets a similar timeout for validity.
Re power: Key fobs already do some form of crypto and broadcast. Adding reception capabilities ought not to be that power hungry.
My solution? Require the manufacturers of vulnerable models to pay the insurance on behalf of the driver/owner as long as the vulnerabilities go unfixed.
If you want to prevent theft, you have to make stealing "expensive" enough for people not to bother with it.
When I bought my most recent car I had a spreadsheet which projected fuel (whether that's gas, electricity, or gas+electricity) and maintenance costs (there was some ball-parking here) for a dozen different models based on our driving habits. Once the list was narrowed down a bit I did some online quotes at my insurance company to add that in.
There were no financial surprises when I bought the car.
Yeah so already different from like 90% of car buyers out there.
As long as they aren’t trivially exploitable like the Hyundai keys, more expensive keys are my problem. Stolen cars are my insurance company’s problem.
But no one has one anymore. I tried to learn in the 90s for about an hour, and never managed to get the car moving forward rather than bouncing. At this point, I don't have much desire to try again, but I wouldn't know how to try if I wanted to.
edit: if you buy em old I mean
me I want an Exige
What if I'm not able to add them as an authenticated user or authentic myself to let them drive, e.g. I'm injured or very drunk?
The only scenarios where one is so injured and/or drunk as to not be able to complete the non-rigamarolish process of sharing a HomeKit home key either by doing it themselves or walking someone through the process are ones where the key holder is so incapacitated that they would be unable to share a physical key.
All of that is someone irrelevant because Express Mode is enabled by default, so if you are unconscious all a person has to do is pull your phone out of your pocket and use it to unlock and start your car the exact same way physical keys work in that situation. It even works if the phone's battery is dead.
https://support.apple.com/en-us/118271
Also, every implementation of CarKit Car Keys I have seen is the same as HomeKit home keys: there is a backup. Either a physical key, PIN, fob, or card.
By making adding an authenticated driver not a rigamarole, but easy and intuitive.
> What if I'm not able to add them as an authenticated user or authentic myself to let them drive, e.g. I'm injured or very drunk?
They call you an ambulance.
https://www.bmw.com/en/innovation/bmw-digital-key-plus-ultra...
IGLA system to block the CAN bus, LIN bus, and ODBII port. It also protects against key fob cloning/relay attacks.
+
A hidden physical kill switch that cuts off the fuel pump relay (the company 41.22 makes a drop in that doesn't require wire splicing).
+
A hidden GPS tracker with an onboard backup battery in the event the car battery is disconnected.
None of this stops someone with a flatbed from simply towing your vehicle away, but at least the GPS tracker will give you a window to locate them.
Today my Polestar app wasn't updating properly. Some things were, but the widget was stuck on manual refresh, and the odometer and location in the app were from the previous location I'd been, not including the trip home.
I stupidly deleted the cache and data for the app. Then tried to reconnect to the car.
This process requires putting all of the fobs (for me, two) in the car, and then getting to the right step in the car as well as the app.
But... here the car claims it cannot find both fobs. While in other parts of the car software, it indicates it can find both fobs. Because of this, I cannot pair the phone and car, and have any of the app features working again.
I would, naturally, factory reset, but this also requires both fobs, and also claims it cannot find them. (I've tested each fob and they both fully work otherwise - just in these two instances, the car acts as if it cannot find them.)
Ultimately the next day (this morning) I unplugged the charger, and hopped in the car and pressed Factory Reset, and it worked like a charm, and everything is fine now.
I don't know if charging was blocking pairing but I assume it was blocking the factory reset. (Just wish error messages were... more informative, you know?!)
I assume somehow data was... not in an ideal state... in the car's internal database, and the factory reset removed the bad data, allowing normal operation to assume.
When you click on the open button on the fob, you send
SHA256(key)
Car responds with a random challenge
RND
Fob sends
SHA256(key XOR RND)
Car does the same calculation and compares.
I approach my car, I press the button on the fob to open it, and your attack does what exactly?
In fact, all of my door openers and car remotes have some form of code-hopping and it's certainly not because they were specifically chosen for that aspect.
Sure, there are attacks for code-hopping systems as well, but it's a completely different league.
I think what can sometimes be done with these is that one can record one or two codes and then desync the original remote. But I agree, it's a different league.
[1] Doesn't have some features which you need to use to actually attack HiTag2: https://github.com/msoos/grainofsalt
[2] Used for various pre-processing that is useful (but not neccessary) to break Megamos, but _far_ from the actual attack: https://github.com/meelgroup/bosphorus/
My car has UWB, there's a LED on the fob that blinks when it is in range and if it's stationary for a short time, it inactivates as well. Some experimentation suggests you need to be within about 5m of the car to open the doors.
The localisation seems to be very accurate, even if you can open the car from a distance it won't start unless the fob is physically within it. If I sit in the driver seat the fob has to be less than 10mm away from the outside of driver's window, otherwise it refuses to start.
Did the professor get tired of uploading the material for students to review post lecture?
