But security-wise, running it in a container is better, than running it without isolation. IMHO.
And of course, no one asks getting this image built by the 3rd party, since the Dockerfile is open, just build it yourself ;-)
Containers are great for development and production on your own infrastructure, or shared infrastructure like GCE or AWS. Security can be had from doing inspected builds, self signing, etc.
For consumers, however, it's a completely different ballgame.
By the time serious hacking is an issue through Steam, I'd expect containers will be that much better anyhow. For all they can be criticized, and regardless of whether you think some other approach would have been better, they're getting the "trial by fire" treatment. By hook or by crook, in another year or two I expect they'll be as secure as you could ask for.
I think kordless is claiming that using Docker here could increase the severity of an attack; otherwise it doesn't seem like putting up another barrier could hurt security, even if it is later broken.
What I actually meant is that I'd rather run an isolated (separated) process from other processes and the file-system space (and the other isolation features which cgroups are giving us), not meaning isolation from the host system.
With the cgroups/namespaces it's a process isolation (or separation, whatever wording you prefer). In the Linux kernel documentation they also use isolation wording. ;-)
The image build instructions are pretty easy to audit. And I trust docker (to an extent).
So in my mind it's safer, but not absolutely safe. I just view it as another layer of security :)
