> I am giving an example that is supportive of the view that, while philosophy was instrumental in the development of the scientific method, it is no longer playing that role, and has not for some time. The second question is another example in the same vein.
1st: For example, was science in a state of confusion until Popper corrected the errors of the logical positivists?
Ideas concerning the scientific method are less clear before Popper assuming you buy into Popper, that much is true, that much is true of any advancement in the philosophy of science. What is not true is that before an advancement lay confusion and after the removal of confusion. Progress wends its way slowly, incrementally, with ideas gaining clarity bit by bit. So it has gone and presumably so it will continue until someone presents an argument that the process of the improvement in our understanding of the scientific method is complete. That proof is for you or someone to provide, not I a proof of its counter-claim.
2nd: Did the development of plate tectonics have to wait until Kuhn explained the structure of scientific revolutions?
No. And you know the answer is no. But so what? If Kuhn is right about how scientific thought progresses it could have an impact on how scientific bodies organise themselves and how funding is allocated and so on, which would have an impact on science at a much larger level than individual hypotheses and theories. Which shows that philosophy of science is still relevant.
