- the system can be updated to take a key as input.
- right, it expands by nearly a half; that's used to make it just as secure as the one-time pad, but more practical. [and this is what i want to verify, then optimize].
if you have the time, i'd love to hear more feedback. thank you very much.
No. There is no such thing as "just as secure as the one-time pad but more practical". If you want information-theoretic security you have to pay for it, and if you don't pay for it you don't get it. Like, there are theorems. That's why mention of OTP is a good proxy for not understanding modern cryptography. Everyone who's serious about it knows that not only are the benefits of the OTP not achievable in almost every practical situation (due to key distribution), nobody actually needs that level of security when 256-bit algorithms are available.
> - right, it expands by half but i believe it's just as secure as the one-time pad [this is what i want to verify]
This is the easiest bit to critique / attack.
For OTP to work the pad needs to be properly random; the pad needs to be bigger than the plain text.
Expanding something else probably stops it being properly random.
People get hung up on OTP because PROVABLY SECURE. They are secure, but they're also cumbersome to use.
> i'm not using any traditional math that current encryption relies on; no entropy, discrete logarithms nor prime factorials, etc.
> i'm not using any traditional math
That doesn't get you an out - the theorems don't care how you transform M to C.
