It's true that, in the Valley, burn rate doesn't much matter. Your one job as a VC-funded startup CEO is to keep investors interested in you and happy. Throwing them expensive bones is better than throwing no bones. With the former, you may need to raise money in 18 months instead of 24, and they'll ask you a lot of questions about why the bone you threw them cost so much. With the latter, they fund your competitors, and then it's over because they've found a shinier, newer toy and, while you might want to switch stage to a sustainable lifestyle business that doesn't need VCs, in practice it's hard to do that in a company that was never built to last (and that probably couldn't withstand an "oops, we grew too fast" layoff) and because investors often won't let you hold growth to a sustainable rate.
On the other hand, VCs determine: whether your company can raise money, whether your competitors get funding, what your acquisition/exit options are, and what kind of job you personally will get after leaving the company (one way or another).
Also, VCs are a small set of people who all know each other and in which one voice can end not just your job or company but your career. Customers are a large set of people where one might get pissed off and write a bad Yelp review.
Excessive burn rate led to the demise of basically good ideas such as Webvan, the first instant-delivery online retailer. Webvan, pushed by their investors, tried to operate in too many cities, and ended up with about 3% market share in 30 cities, instead of 30% market share in 3 cities. (The head of operations at Webvan went to Amazon, and is responsible for making Amazon a success in that industry.)
This time around, most startups monetize earlier, so we see less of that.
It occurs to me that a lot of this bubble-like behavior may come from an initial market leader obscuring what they're actually doing and then lots of followers jumping on. Amazon was profitable on a unit-sold basis from Day 1, even before taking investment, but they invested all the profits back into capital improvements for the business, which made it look like they were hemorrhaging large amounts of money. Investors and other startups saw this and their success and thought "The way to succeed in the dot-com era is to burn lots of money!", completely overlooking that Amazon had validated their business model beforehand and showed it to be profitable, and then only expanded afterwards.
I believe that the trend toward "Just get lots of users, and the money will follow!" in the mid-2000s had a similar origin. People saw the Google founders say "We didn't know how we were going to make money when we started", it worked out for them, and so they all started businesses where they had no idea how to make money. I'm about 98% sure that the Google founders had maybe a dozen ideas about how to make money at the time they incorporated, they just needed to test them (so their statement was technically true), and it was highly likely that at least one would work out.
Presumably, the author is responding to Marc Andreessen's comments here:
http://www.businessinsider.com/marc-andreessen-on-startup-bu...
However, the author has ignored the qualifiers and substance of Marc's comments. Marc specifically said, "behind the scenes, they're plowing through that money either on marketing, overhead, or some other expense, which results in high burn rates."
Marc is talking about companies like Pets.com blowing wads of cash on Superbowl ads. He's not talking about a company like Tesla spending a lot of money on battery innovation and other core research. I think Marc knows the difference between the "burn rates" of Pets.com vs Tesla.
Who's to say Tesla is spending their money wisely on battery tech investments? Only time will tell if their battery R&D bets will pay off and if not, perhaps they would have been better off spending that money on Super Bowl advertising.
My comment was not about an omniscient oracle predicting the future of winners and losers. Yes, Tesla may ultimately fail. We don't know yet.
The article is bad quality because it misrepresents the statements by the VCs he's responding to. The three VCs Bill Gurley (Benchmark), Marc Andreessen (AH), Fred Wilson (Union Square Ventures) of all people would absolutely know that you have to spend money to make money. And yes, that would sometimes involve high burn rates.
The author sets up a straw man by implying those VCs are so financially inept that they only look at "burn rate" in a naked and isolated manner with zero context to what each company is doing with the money. Therefore, he's supposedly the lone voice of reason. He thinks he's doing us a favor by explaining to us that "high burn rate" can be good and we're now smarter than those VCs for being englightened with such knowledge. Really?! I think that's insulting the intelligence of HN readers.
Seriously, does anyone think that Marc Andreessen who lived through the zero-profit cash burning days of Netscape before & after the IPO has no clue about stupid-vs-smart high burn rates?
Tesla is burning a lot of cash, and they may fail. If so, they would have gone down in a blaze of glory by way of investing in their technology and betting wrong instead of spending stupid money on distractions such as Superbowl ads.
> If you're expanding too fast, don't count on your board to warn you. As VCs, kill-or-cure strategies serve their interests.
VCs like high burn rate companies, because they are beholden to VCs. So in the case that it does work out, the VCs will own a large percentage of the company.
If you are founding a company and hope for the company to be successful and generate some wealth for yourself, high burn isn't necessarily the right strategy.
That said, VC money is very expensive money, so getting the most out of it is essential. Being afraid to use it is self defeating, and taking it for granted is risky. But pretty much everyone knows that :-)
I know burn rate can't be analyzed in a vacuum (how many variables can be?), and a high burn rate can be a good thing, but my guess is more companies fail (partially) due to poor management of capital than fail due to spending too slowly.
Are there many examples of the latter that anyone knows of, even if somewhat anecdotal?
Admittedly, all else will not be equal as your vary your burn rate, but keeping it down the bare minimum required to do the essential technological development, business development, marketing and sales will always give you better odds of long-term success. That "bare minimum" rate may actually be very high, but it's still something any CEO should be paying careful attention to.
For those of us that lived through the first round of internet/investor blowhards and shady math[1] this style of article is depressingly familiar.
Although at least now when I read this kind of nonsense no trees are killed in its delivery, so we've got that going for us.
[1] http://www.amazon.com/Dow-36-000-Strategy-Profiting/dp/06098...
Exactly this.
So basically, this article is entirely self serving. Surprise surprise. Listen at your own peril.
On this article's own terms, if everyone is burning like crazy, then it likely that companies in all four quadrants of the high/low execution/efficiency, which means there is bad burn going on.
If you are a company, this means time for self-reflection: (if you want to take the article’s framework seriously) which quadrant are you in? are you burning cash smartly or dumbly? Do you have framework for determining this? do you really believe your revenue can grow faster than your costs? are there places you can reduce cost? how much are you paying for growth in each of your channels, and which are actually worth it short and long term?
If you are a VC, it is time for portfolio-reflection and (if your portfolio companies are lucky) some hands-on portfolio-company coaching: is a company you funded raising again 6 months later (and was this planned…)? have you asked for a burn report and/or a path to profitability? does the board deck summarize the company’s return on spending and tie results to spending (not necessarily in $$ to $$ numbers, but to users, engagement, etc.)? do your CEOs know their main costs, both fixed and variable?
When $$ floods the early-stage market, both companies and VCs do not ask themselves these types of questions enough, and I think Gurley/Andreessen are trying to signal the industry to get more mindful.
It's great to fund growth by burning money, but once the company reaches a respectable size I'd make a plan for how to reach profitability and update it periodically. That plan might be as simple as ceasing all hiring for a year while the revenues grow enough to overtake costs.
Consider the case of Europe. Negative yield curves but trillions in pension funds that need a positive nominal return (5% or so). If they invest even a portion of their portfolios in negative yielding bonds they then need to buy assets with growth potential to even it out, with PE and VC being the most attractive due to their illiquidity ironically.
This isn't like 00 when you could sell NASDAQ and buy US government bonds yielding 6.5%..