No.

Remanence attacks are pointless against non-volatile media. You use them against volatile media in a physical attack in an attempt to sneak under/manipulate the limits of that volatility to cause violations of security assumptions, such as "the keys are in RAM" (true) > "RAM is instantly volatile on shutdown" (not quite true) > "keys are instantly zeroised on shutdown" (not this easily they're not).

Some RAM is much more volatile than conventional bulk SRAM or DRAM (for example, frequently L1/L2 caches on CPUs are impractical to exploit). Properly encrypt bulk data held in high-remenance or non-volatile RAM with a key held in such low-remanance RAM, and your security problem is solved.

That still doesn't answer the question. If you treat non-volatile memory as a disk, then the data would never touch it unencrypted, so a cold boot attack is useless against the non-volotile memory. Of course, you could still launch a cold boot attack on the volotile memory, but we can do that already.