I am aware of both names, thank you.

>That only has to happen once for Google to put a gun to the rogue CA's temple.

Google can't really help in every single case. There are many situations where Google's revocation scheme can't keep up.

You also have to put a lot of trust in Google. You think Google is going to issue a revocation if they're under legal pressure not to?

As you are aware, human factors are frequently the weakest parts in a cryptosystem.

But it's unsuitable for the entirety of the web. You can't hardcode all certificate fingerprints of the whole internet inside the browser.

>> The migration away from the CA model is called "certificate pinning".

> key continuity destroys the incentive to attack sites by compromising CAs

We need to ELIMINATE CAs (CA as in some third party (google, Verysign, GoDaddy, ...) who you have to trust). The whole concept of trusting a CA is broken, and pinning does nothing to address that, at least not in the proposed TACK implementation.