You'll note that I didn't comment on his post about Gentry's homomorphic encryption scheme, for two reasons: (1) homomorphic encryption is a very boring topic, and (2) I don't feel like I have an authoritative argument for Schneier not being qualified to talk about it. Having dispensed with the straw man in your second graf, I'll take the 1st and 3rd in order.

I have been interviewed by reporters. And I have, in fact, made lots of mistakes with them. Security researchers are unnaturally attractive to trade reporters, and there's business value in cultivating contacts with them, and I've definitely let that process run too far in the past.

So, a mistake is a mistake. And thus, regarding your first graf, two responses:

(1) I stand by my original argument that Schneier doesn't appear to be close enough to Chrome OS security to comment on it, and his comments appear to misconstrue what Chrome OS is aiming for, and

(2) I stand by my original argument that this is an example of Schneier's business objective of inserting himself into every conversation about computer security again coming at a cost of his credibility.

Finally, you want to understand my need to pull Schneier down. I don't care if he's smart. I care that he's a guru. He's listened to uncritically by lay professionals, and his opinions about the problems they face are often not valuable. I'll add that Schneier's reputation in cryptography --- a field I am not a part of --- is not ironclad. If you want to stick up for a scientist, start with their citation record. Let us know what you find.