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0 pointsGHFigs13y ago0 comments

He's not even willing to mention the specific agency involved.

This is part of him pleading guilty to these charges, one of which is over "more than one classified memorandum from a government intelligence agency". It's not him personally being shifty about it--that's what the charge is.

But of course then the question is how he was able to access them given the impression I get is his office was rather low security, not a SCIF.

He refers to the "T-SCIF" many times in this statement, 'T' meaning 'Temporary'. There's even a photo in the chat logs published by Wired.

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jasonwatkinspdx13y ago· 1 in thread

Ah, thanks, I'd skipped over some of the more procedural parts of his statement. I'm surprised it was so easy for him to access and copy such material without detection. I guess if it appeared like it was in the course of his duties it wouldn't raise any alarms.

mpyne13y ago

Read his statement. His entire job was to sift through all available information to present the best and most accurate possible picture to his chain-of-command for use when formulating courses of action.

That wouldn't just entail what the "enemy" is doing, that would also include what other government agencies are up to, what allies are up to, links to the other major field of combat for the Army, etc.

Given that is what his job entailed though, you would think they would have a much more stringent screening process for access to that material. With nuclear weapons they have a specific personnel reliability program (http://www.ncis.navy.mil/securitypolicy/PRP/Pages/NuclearWea...). I'm not saying they need something as stringent for intel analysts but they need to have something.

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