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0 pointsRetr0id2d ago0 comments

WASM implementations are fairly mature now, but if there was e.g. an image file format with embedded WASM that needed to execute before you could view it, it would become the new low-hanging-fruit target for 0-click RCEs - whether it's exploiting the WASM engine itself or some other attack surface that's influenceable via it (See also, the FORCEDENTRY JBIG2 exploit).

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titzer2d ago· 2 in thread

That exploit targeted an integer overflow in a bespoke Apple sandboxing mechanism. Bespoke sandboxing mechanisms have weird bugs.

Not that Wasm engines don't have bugs, but the whole point is to have an extremely solid, well-specified and efficient implementation of a widely accepted bytecode format. We can scope down the capabilities given to any program to a minimal set.

Retr0idOP2d ago

Bugs are near-inevitable, and mitigations are the last line of defence. Scripting engines are excellent for bypassing mitigations (iiuc in the case of the FORCEDENTRY exploit, it was used for adjusting ASLR'd offsets).

As a random example that's an area of personal interest to me, I know of 3 distinct methods of achieving userland ROP execution of the Nintendo Switch 2, and all three rely on the (ab)use of a scripting engine (even if they aren't a vulnerability in the scripting engine itself).

titzer2d ago

Well don't accept code from anyone ever then.

But seriously, if your format requires extensibility to the point that it embeds a bytecode, especially a Turing-complete bytecode, what format are you going to choose? Just design a new one? That's how you end up with a scripting engine with three ROP exploits.

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