But there are also people who just oppose utilitarianism, like G.E.M. Anscombe. For instance, in https://integrityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/mr_t..., she seems to grant that dropping the nuclear bombs on Japan was probably good from a utilitarian perspective (because it saved lives overall) and also to grant that bombing campaigns that necessarily entail massive civilian deaths (including, apparently, area bombing German cities) are morally permissible but still to argue that dropping the nuclear bombs was impermissible because it constituted murder ("intentionally" killing the innocent). But this kind of distinction, which I think is what actual anti-utilitarianism must come to, is hard to even consistently maintain, and I suppose many HN readers would find the effort quixotic.
It is relatively easy to take the proceeds of a massive fraud, buy a relatively small (as a percentage of the fraud) $ amount of mosquito nets, and save more lives than the lives impacted by your massive theft. Is this a correct application of the utilitarian calculus? What sort of data would we need a priori to do this calculation "correctly"? Do you think he had a careful estimate of the suicide rate of victims of ponzi schemes before perpetuating the fraud, or would any suicide rate have made the decision net [pun intended] moral, as any such victim of fraud would lead to >> 1 net purchased (so you would almost always net save lives).
The above is of course snarky. It is also a best-effort way of analyzing a notable utilitarian's actions. I do not think it would be difficult at all to use this type of argument to argue that SBF's actions net raised utility in the world. If only we all would become fraudsters, then we could truly live in Omelas --- a notable utilitarian paradise.
Even people who say they are deontologists often slip back into utilitarian arguments when they're not careful — for example, when arguing Kant's categorical imperative against lying, they slip into talking about the local benefits vs. overall harms.
The real gap, as you've said, is more about overconfidence in one's utilitarian calculus for distal vs. proximal moral outcomes. An average Joe is likely to give a lot more weight to the moral outcomes that rely on local information and affect his friends and family. The characterization of an "EA" — whether fair or not — is that they're much more likely to use a lot more explicit moral calculus and attempt to correct for proximal vs. distal biases.
In a way its very similar to Sowell's arguments about the informational economics of a distributed market vs. a central planner.
I don't think people are objecting to the EA idea that some charities are more evidence based than others so much as the distinctly EA idea that it would be more effective still to donate to charities like OpenAI
now its utilitarianism taken to the extreme. if you believe a skynet scenario killing everyone on earth is plausible then the "logical" thing to do is allow literally anything in the name of stopping it. that includes mass murder and dictatorship. the only thing that can balance the infinite negative value from an evil machine god is the infinite positive value from a good machine god.
thats the main difference today, one faction around sam and dario believes in creating the good ASI first and sacrificing all the world resources to do it before someone makes the bad one, the more pessimistic like yud want to stop all ai development to reduce the risk that an evil god is made to zero.
at this point its basically a religion.
I understand how one may wonder if there was a way to do that, but it feels insane to me that one would actually conclude that "yes, it is possible". We have examples everywhere showing that it is generally impossible to define a metric that correctly represents the underlying concept we want to measure.
Said differently, I feel like Effective altruism fundamentally starts by saying "I don't believe in Goodhart's law". Which seems intellectually dishonest to me.
> Look. I’m the last person who’s going to deny that the road we’re on is littered with the skulls of the people who tried to do this before us. But we’ve noticed the skulls. We’ve looked at the creepy skull pyramids and thought “huh, better try to do the opposite of what those guys did”.
https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/04/07/yes-we-have-noticed-th...
"Look. I see that it doesn't work. I want it to work, so I will continue trying, even if it fundamentally cannot work. I am not interested in thinking about whether or not it can work. I am interested in showing to the world that I am well-intentioned and trying to do something, even if that something doesn't make sense".
