Again, I am not saying it is related but I think it has an impact.
Now in many places it is encouraged by coders and managers to vibe stuff on their own devices. Soon or later it will become a problem, especially for those that have no idea what they are doing.
I am not saying it is related but I feel that it coincides perfectly.
I just cannot believe there is no underlaying thread going through all of these recent supply chain issues, and yes there are some hacking groups that specialise in this, sure, but it is because the bounty is plentiful.
It's a continuation of the Shai Halud worm and the lack of security around developer dependnecy installations, which has existed for a very long time.
Hackers have figured out that developers themselves are an ideal target due to how easy it is to trick them into installing something and how much private information they have on their machines (creds, cloud clis, mcps, etc.).
You have tools from large corporations where the official installation procedure involves copy pasting a command from a random blog post, run it with sudo and watch it download and execute a script from a random filehost. This is somehow deemed acceptable by everyone involved.
Meanwhile I can't use teams in our meeting rooms, since any form of internet access was deemed a security risk in rooms where customer projects could be discussed. This is in a day and age where 90% of customer meetings are done over the internet.
Anyone trying to follow sane practices in this industry just asks to end up in a padded cell.
Yes in our place too. "You better do as much as possible with AI or you will be left behind" dogmas etc.
It's the stupid IoT hype all over again. No concern for security, just trying to be the first in the pack.
Welp.
Unfortunately, most developers don't like them so it is a though sell.
I personally think the, perhaps confusingly named, capability based security models are the way of The Future.
Gonna be a hard nut to crack to implement this across the supply chain.
Transitive dependencies are a bitch.
I have used agents for a few components externally, that I've adopted/used internally... but those were 100% code reviewed, not vibe coded. One was an intro animation using a couple SVGs and CSS. Another was an image zoom control where I needed some behaviors and not a lot extra. Both significantly tweaked by hand as well.
I'm more a proponent of working as a gatekeeper as opposed to vibe coding... Though I think a better term would be nice.
Idiots must suffer.
I am not saying vibe coding is the issue. The issue is that a typical developer might be working on a lot more projects that run concurrently then they used to. And because of the various nature of the project the risk is significantly increased.
Scale this across the workforce and you not just doubled the problem.
Using a proper sandboxing(https://github.com/ashishb/amazing-sandbox) regularly will drastically limit the blast radius of these attacks.
Does your Docker backend run commands in rootless containers? I skimmed the code but didn't see anything to confirm this.
You can pass your favorite rootless Docker image using `--custom-docker-image` CLI parameter.
Furthermore, you can use native sandboxing on macOS if you prefer.
If neither looks serious to you, then please educate me on a better sandboxing approach.
What alternative do you suggest?
Do you mean not install outside a sandbox?
It will always introduce friction, though.
Modern software development is simply too fast to be reviewed properly.
If your distribution requires more than this, then it's not really a module, or combines too many non-modular components, and should be distributed differently.
The ability for npm to run scripts on any level should be removed.
Then we can go back to worrying about namespacing issues.
> Individually, any one of the failings described above might be understandable. Taken together, they point to a failure of Microsoft’s organizational controls and governance, and of its corporate culture around security.
Microsoft’s products and services are ubiquitous. It is one of the most important technology companies in the world, if not the most important. This position brings with it utmost and global responsibilities. It requires a security-focused corporate culture of accountability, which starts with the CEO, to ensure that financial or other go-to-market factors do not undermine cybersecurity and the protection of Microsoft’s customers.
> Unfortunately, throughout this review, the Board identified a series of operational and strategic decisions that collectively point to a corporate culture in Microsoft that deprioritized both enterprise security investments and rigorous risk management. These decisions resulted in significant costs and harm for Microsoft customers around the world.
> The Board is convinced that Microsoft should address its security culture.
[0] https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/CSRB-Review-S...
[1]: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/trust-center/security/secure...
[2]: https://cybermagazine.com/articles/how-microsoft-is-securing...
In any case, you're free to remove Microsoft's certificates and enroll your own.
This latest event just continues Microsoft's track record of being a security problem rather than having their shit together. :(
Then, which I find the most amusing, proceeds to blame MicroSlop for the attempted suuply chain attack,
> Microsoft did not immediately provide the specific number of customers affected, when asked by TechCrunch.
Yeah, because that's how open source works. Tech crunch doing hard work no not explain that.
> This is Microsoft’s second known breach over the past few weeks that has allowed hackers to compromise its open source projects, per Ars Technica.
I, like many others love to knock on Microslop when I can, but in this case they did the right thing. The article phrases it like they did everything wrong, they're all at fault and shame on them for limiting the breach.
This is not the first time I've seen an article from Zack Whittaker that just rubbed me the wrong way.
> steal passwords of AI developers
This phrasing has it's own connotations. AI developers versus developers who use AI?
> This is the latest example in recent months of hackers breaching widely popular open source projects with the aim of planting malware on a large number of users who have the code installed on their computers. These hacks are known as “supply chain” attacks as they target code that is often used in a large number of software products, or by a specific kind of user, which may be advantageous to hack as they sometimes have access to cloud systems and large amounts of customers’ data.
Describes literally nothing of what a supply chain attack is, just the result of one and the reasons for their attack surface.
Very very bad reporting in my opinion. Bad breach, and I hate to admit M$ did the safe and right thing, but this 'reporting' leaves a lot to be desired.
> I, like many others love to knock on Microslop when I can, but in this case they did the right thing.
I've no idea what your problem with this sentence is. They have an organisational security problem, aided/demonstrated by lack of effort to effectively lockdown GitHub Actions and allowing MRs to circumvent CI/CD.
That this is a Microsoft problem that was present pre-AI is not up for debate. See https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-03/CSRBReviewO...
In the age of AI, it's now endemic and being weaponised.
No argument from me, but what would you have them do in the immediate timeframe ?
Microsoft which owns GitHub, has been washing their hands if any responsibility in helping to resolve the ongoing supply chain catastrophe which is hosted and spread nearly entirely via Github repositories: not responding to security researchers flagging malware hosted on GitHub; doing nothing to address the proliferation of open source malware across their platform, giving no recourse for action, not applying their tremendous resources to the problem, fiddling as the open source community burns and leaving the devs to fend for themselves. Let's not mention the recent very hostile and trust-erodibg behavior towards bug bounty security researchers.
The *&$@ finally spread all the way up to the top of the hill in a compromise of Microsoft's own repos, which I think highlights the scale of the problem.
And in response, they offer a watery corporate platitude, "a few customers were affected in a recent incident, and we're looking into it."
They did not read the source code of the worm implant and have absolutely no clue how the worm works, if that is their response.
The only way to meaningfully stop the worm is by requiring manual confirmations for git commit/push actions and for the auto-executed hooks in all IDEs. Also, these scripts should be sandboxed to only be allowed to run and interact with files inside the same opened project folder.
Well, that, or setting the host system language to Russian. Which I am kind of expecting Microsoft to do next...
If you are going to be handing tokens to AI agents on weird openclaw contraptions, you should try to use the fine grained variants. My GitHub account spans 3 organizations with wildly differing policies. The fact that classic tokens are even still allowed blows my mind a bit. You should be required to manually opt in each organization at a minimum.
Give each dev's AI agent its own identity with its own access controls and tokens and everything.
It helps solve both the access control and attribution issues
Why isn't it standard to have a security log that shows what permissions were requested, with what scope, so we can at least create a minimal set of permissions by trying an operation, seeing what permissions are necessary, and then setting just the needed permissions? If you're worried about that log itself becoming a compromise, make it something that is off by default, and maybe automatically turns off after some period of time, or make me use a burner token for this operation, or something, but the alternative is the world of excessively-broad permissions that we live in now. Why isn't there a helper mode that a dev can use to point at an interaction and say "now give me minimal permissions for those interactions", not only to configure a given key but so we can learn what permissions actually mean in practice?
We're given these super complicated knobs, but all we get for using them is a few textual blurbs about the settings and the blame if we don't configure them exactly correctly, and also the blame if something breaks because we were too tight with the permissions.
This seems such a basic tool to use these super complicated systems yet I've never seen them anywhere on the web.
Perhaps ironically, perhaps just because it was already complicated enough and needed a way to approach usable, the notoriously difficult to use SELinux uses this as the more-or-less standard way of setting permissions. I can't believe I'm missing SELinux.
Also, the title is misleading, setup adds config to be auto executed by people who work on the repo. They would have to use vscode/cursor/claude/gemini. People who use codex / opencode / other harnesses are safe I guess.
Details: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/miasma-worm-hits-microsoft-...
I have a good friend that works for one of the giants(I can't say which one for obvious reasons but S&P 500). He's been working there for quite a while now, so far he hasn't seen what the project he works on looks like, has the repo cloned and knows what language is used but nothing beyond that. Everything is slopped together. His project is the authentication and authorization system for all the company products. In his own words "I hit Tab all day long and write 'this is intended' in the reviews, which are all ai, there is no human in the loop. This is what we are told to do by the CEO and CTO unironically. If something breaks, no one knows how any of this works since no one has seen the actual code. Our performance reviews are based on how many tokens we've used, not what we have done". I suspect this is the case in many companies now so it's not unreasonable to think that there are no actual code reviews.
When that boost disappears after the IPOs, everything will crash.
I can’t think of any obvious reason other than this being embellished / made up? Those companies have tens of thousands of employees you aren’t going to “out” anyone by naming the company.
So this is related to the Sept 2025 security breach of Github.
> The five repos carry 1,459 GitHub stars between them, mantine-datatable alone accounting for 1,225. Stars are a rough proxy for how many developers have the source checked out locally, which is the population this attack targets.
> Every commit: unsigned, github-actions identity, chore: update dependencies [skip ci], the same six-file footprint. A 49-second sweep across five repos is automation, not a human committing. This matches Shai-Hulud self-propagation: harvest a GitHub token with write access from a prior infection, then push the persistence payload into every repo the token can reach.
https://safedep.io/miasma-worm-ai-coding-agent-config-inject...
What it is doing: https://safedep.io/config-files-that-run-code/
I'm not related to those guys. That's the simplest detailed explanation of what is happening that I've found.
I read 90%+ of the code I generate by reviewing it like I would a junior developer. I'm heavily vibe-coding a new feature right now and it's going to get a thorough reading as soon as GitHub's PRs start working again
Based on the news, seems like it is better to not include Microsoft at all in there.
There aren't many institutions extant today that I could trust to properly construct and operate a nuclear reactor, never mind manage nuclear waste for the next 100000 years.
The Trump government just decided that there is an acceptable level to irradiate the population by the way (abandoned the linear-no-threshold model of radiation's effects on an organism)
What does this even mean?
The malware specifically steals passwords from developers who use AI? From those who develop AI tool? Or it steals API tokens, which serve a similar function as passwords do for humans?
Is this what journalism looks like today? Just slap the two holy letters on the title and you get views?
(Yes, I read the article. No, I still don't think the title makes sense. You can skip this techchurch slop and read the real information here: https://opensourcemalware.com/blog/miasma-reaches-azure)
VSCode will be used by plenty of non-AI-using developers, and the credential harvester is not specific to AI API tokens, but that 3/4 of the targets are AI coding tools is I assume where the claim comes from.
If the techchurch post is written by a human then I'll take this as an example that humans outslop AI.
* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48418318 (The Blight Reaches Microsoft: 73 Repos Disabled in 105 Seconds)
* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48450543 (Miasma Worm Hits Microsoft Again: Azure Functions Action and 72 Other Repositories Disabled After Supply Chain Attack Targeting AI Coding Agents)
* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48416155
* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48416269 (Miasma Worm Targets AI Coding Agents via GitHub Repos)
On Monday, the Hades campaign introduced Composer, Go and Pip support. Before that it had only support for NPM and AI assistant editors. (Well, and Ruby btw but nobody uses Rubygems anymore it seems).
What even Microsoft gets wrong: This is the first worm that runs on all platforms in the code ecosystem. Developer host machines, servers, ci/cd runners. And all of them spread the worm to all repositories that are accessible on those machines.
You would have to completely shutdown 100% of all computers AND aws ec2 AND google cloud platform AND azure AND kubernetes clusters AT THE SAME TIME to beat this worm. It literally spreads across all infrastructure.
Kill switch, as always with APT28 malware, is setting the host language to ru_RU.KOI8-R (LANG environment variable). That disables the spread mechanism.
My Mitigation Tool (I'm updating it as new package systems are targeted ...):
https://github.com/cookiengineer/antimiasma
Blog post:
https://cookie.engineer/weblog/articles/malware-insights-mia...
I was getting multiple of these a day and found that if you set up the Microsoft Authenticator app from a phone, it will force it to passwordless if you have any type of lock on your phone (facial, fingerprint, pin). The only way around it is to disable all of those while setting up the account in the authenticator app. I don't use my Microsoft account much, so just use a separate e-mail now for verification instead of the authenticator app.
The fact that this is how it works is of course insane, but I'm guessing someone inside of Microsoft is hitting their KPIs for passwordless logins or something...
The attack vector isn't just plugins that steal your data, but also 0-day exploits in just about any software you use, and even your own web services being exploited by a script kiddy with an LLM. There will be an increase in hacks and it's only going to get worse, so anyone not investing in cyber security audits and auditing tools should really reconsider.
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Most of my userspace apps are in Flatpak sandboxes (yeah they are not great), but otherwise it feels like isolation and airgapping is the most sensible solution for now, and it’ll get increasingly worse unless the vibe coders somehow learn how to write robust software.
It’s like during the black plague: the (software) world has become dangerous, we have no way to contain it, it is unfeasible to remove yourself completely from the world, so you better pray really hard you don’t catch the bug and infect your peers. How’s that for a field we used to call software engineering or computer science?
Really drives home this org chart: https://www.businessinsider.com/big-tech-org-charts-2011-6
How many other OSS repos of similarly sized companies get compromised like this?
No one ever got fired for choosing IBM or AWS - but apparently Microsoft has a decades long free pass everywhere.
Insane.
The connotation here being either "open source is dangerous" or "Microsoft's specific brand of open source is dangerous" -- which coincidentally provides good clickbait for both "pro-open source" and "anti open source" types.
Anyway, not reading. They should do better.
Skynet is winning now.
