I agree airbus shares the blame but it's not the only one. The pilots should have realised the situation they were in, their training should have been better, there were a lot of factors.
Admiral cloudberg has a good deep dive on it. https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/the-long-way-down-the-cr...
Air France didn't implement them and Airbus didn't require them because of money. They thought the chance of it causing a real accident was low and decided to risk it. Despite there being known near accidents already.
And yes, "[the pilots] training should have been better" is part of the things that put both companies at fault. It's not the pilots fault that their training didn't cover it.
I am pretty confident that aircraft manufacturers themselves cannot require these things, only regulators can. The FAA in particular used to lean heavily on budget constraints for airlines (who would also push back against expensive upgrades); but I am sure the same applies to EASA and other regulators as well.
Yes there were UX factors. Yes training could be better. Yes distractions happen
But if I'm going to blame the companies I'm going to blame them on putting someone inexperienced and probably who did not have the right mindset in navigating the profession. And meanwhile companies waste time in making automations on top of manual processes that make things even more complicated
Could you be more specific here? The article doesn't even say which problem Airbus are considered to be criminally liable for.
How do you get this "sense" of writing code and building systems by yourself if all you do is instruct some agent to do it? Are we all going to be like Bonin in the future where we just don't understand anything outside of the agent box?
This is both terrifying and sad.
The other piece of the picture is that pilots acknowledge that their skills are perishable, and they have to commit to ongoing training. This would be analogous to writing code by hand and getting a licensed engineer to sign off on your currency periodically even if you use LLMs for work.
It makes Air France look worse that all three pilots didn't react properly (or weren't trained or experienced), than just faulting Bonin. And at least two of them were sleep-deprived. But there were multiple systemic failures, not just the pilots.
So low in fact that the majority of the recent "accidents" look like suicides from the pilots. The pilots know exactly what they are doing when crashing the planes.
Then it’s a good thing they didn’t. Both Airbus and Air France were found guilty, and poor pilot training was specifically called out as a reason why Air France was considered guilty. It’s in the article.
no wonder airbus was found guilty
How poorly trained in basic airmanship were they and how were they allowed to be pilots? That's the blame component for AF.
Your response is very human, but also deeply irrational. In practical terms of safety it is irrelevant if the pilot is to blame or not or to what degree.
All we should want to do is analyze the reasons why the crash happened and adjust the aviation safety system such that it never happens again.
If pilot actions contributed, then we must ask why and how exactly, then fix those factors through better airplane design and pilot training.
Just blaming someone, then moving on may make you feel good inside, but does nothing to improve safety.
> This is flying 101.
>
> How poorly trained in basic airmanship were they and how were they allowed to be pilots?
Thoughts like these about three experienced professional pilots should make you do at least a double take. It is far more likely that you're dead wrong than that those pilots were so incompetent they didn't even know the basics.
Vs
Fraud for two crashes caused by knowingly having unsafe planes (and two whistleblowers conveniently die)
2) Flight recorders weren't recovered until 2011
3) Manslaughter charges initially recommended in 2011
4) Accident report released in 2012
5) A long time with a lot of lawyers arguing about whether or not the charges should be heard in court
6) Charges dropped in 2019
7) However, public prosecutor announced proceeding with prosecution in 2021
8) Trial began in 2022
9) Both Airbus and AF acquitted in 2023
10) Prosecutor lodges an appeal in 2023
11) Trial begins in appeals court in 2025
12) Appeals court finds both companies guilty in 2026
Basically - these are two huge companies in France, they have a _lot_ of well paid lawyers, and a lot of political heft, but then there was a large amount of public outrage - and so the debate about whether or not to actually prosecute the case continued 2012 through to 2021 - the prosecutor reopening the charges in 2021 was due to intense public pressure.
Cruically once it actually went to trial, it only took 4 years to reach a conclusion including with appeals, which is quicker than I'd expect - and something I noticed is that the appeals court was able to find them guilty, I'm not sure how it goes in other common law country judiciaries, but in my country, if this had gone to an appeals court, they don't have the power to find you guilty, but they could overturn the previous ruling, and direct the lower court to begin the trial again - so it would have been even slower.
I guess that's an aspect of civil law judicial systems that might be considered an advantage.
That seems a bit far fetched.
Or, you know, just hit someone with a car. Criminal charges are often not filed even if the driver is clearly at fault.
Error is not binary, it's a statistic. Even perfectly trained pilots/programmers do make errors depending on the situation. What you should ask is what the error chance is, and if it acceptable.
As the accident report shows, the exact same pitot tube failure happened at least 15 times and recovered by the pilots. The 16th time, it killed more than two hundred people. Do you think a 1/16 chance of dying is appropriate in modern aviation safety?
Out of the X% times this error occurs, are you okay with 1/16% failure? Can you avoid the failure-mode?
What if mode 2 fails 2x of the time and it can't be averted by switching to the Y language.
Investigators concluded the co-pilots did not have the training to deal with the situation
Blame.
"At 32 years old, Bonin was the least experienced pilot on the flight crew. When the aircraft's pitot tubes froze and iced over in a storm, the automated systems temporarily failed and disabled the autopilot. This forced the crew into manual flight. Because the Airbus A330 features independent, non-linked sidesticks, the other co-pilot in the cockpit, David Robert, could not physically feel that Bonin was holding his stick back. The aircraft's computer simply averaged their opposing inputs."
The experience of pilots has been dropping like a stone. This is hidden due to new technology, but when unusual situations arise many current pilots have no situational awareness.
--
"A vote to reduce the 1,500-hour rule for pilot training will mean blood on your hands when the inevitable accident occurs as a result of an inadequately trained flight crew."
-- Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/airbus-agrees-pay-ov...
