But I doubt it, they will lazily backport these patches to create some frankenstein one-off version and be done with it.
Before anyone says "tHaT's wHaT sTaBlE iS fOr": they have literally shipped straight-up broken packages before, because fixing it would somehow make it not "stable". They would rather ship useless, broken code than something too new. It's crazy.
The thing to complain about is if the version in testing is ancient.
FWIW the fixes referenced here are already fixed in trixie: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/source-package/d...
That whole model dates to before automated testing was even really a thing, and no one knew how to do QA; your QA was all the people willing to run your code and report bugs, and that took time. Not to mention, you think the C of today is bad? Have you looked at old C?
And the disadvantage is that backporting is manual, resource intensive, and prone to error - and the projects that are the most heavily invested in that model are also the projects that are investing the least in writing tests and automated test infrastructure - because engineering time is a finite resource.
On top of that, the backport model heavily discourages the kinds of refactorings and architectural cleanups that would address bugs systemically and encourage a whack-a-mole approach - because in the backport model, people want fixes they can backport. And then things just get worse and worse.
We'd all be a lot better off if certain projects took some of the enthusiasm with which they throw outrageous engineering time at backports, and spent at least some of that on automated testing and converting to Rust.
I use Arch on my laptop, when I got it 2 years ago the amd gpu was a bit new so it was prudent to get the latest kernel, mesa, everything. Since I use it daily it's not bad to update weekly and keep on top of occasional config migrations.
I use Debian stable on my home server, it's been in-place upgraded 4-ish times over 10 years. I can install weekly updates without worrying about config updates and such. I set up most stuff I wanted many years ago, and haven't really wanted new features since, though I have installed tailscale and jellyfin from their separate debian package repos so they are very current. It does the same jobs I wanted it to do 8 years ago, with super low maintenance.
But if you don't want Debian stable, that's fine. Just let others enjoy it.
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-2291
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4890
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4891
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4892
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4893
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-5172
fixed, fixed, fixed, fixed, fixed and fixedNowadays, even with Ubuntu’s two year or so release cycle I have to use 3rd party packages to have up to date software (PHP being one) and not some version from three years ago.
We no longer live in a world (with few exceptions) where running a 3-5 year old distribution (still supported) makes sense.
I'll have to update them because eventually security updates will stop. That means that the python code on them no longer works on current python versions, C++ needs some tweaks because some library changed API.
Better to do these things every few years than every 6 months for no reason whatsoever.
If I was to run dnsmasq on Debian, it would be in a container. Since I run Pihole (in a container), it kinda is.
And no "good faith" assumption here, since you literally claim debian stable ships broken kernels, according to you nobody should be able to even boot a computer.
And did you open a high severity bug or you just kept it to yourself until you came here to complain years after the fact?
Irrelevant strawman, since you're not accusing the dnsmasq package in Debian stable of being straight-up broken.
My own MaraDNS has been extensively audited now that we’re in the age of AI-assisted security audits.
Not one single serious security bug has been found since 2023. [1]
The only bugs auditers have been finding are things like “Deadwood, when fully recursive, will take longer than usual to release resources when getting this unusual packet” [2] or “This side utility included with MaraDNS, which hasn’t been able to be compiled since 2022, has a buffer overflow, but only if one’s $HOME is over 50 characters in length” [3]
I’m actually really pleased just how secure MaraDNS is now that it’s getting real in depth security audits.
[1] https://samboy.github.io/MaraDNS/webpage/security.html
I fixed CVE-2014-5461 for Lunacy back in 2021:
https://github.com/samboy/lunacy/commit/4de84e044c1219b06744...
This is discussed here:
https://samboy.github.io/MaraDNS/webpage/security.html#CVE-2...
In addition, I have done other security hardening with Lunacy compared to Lua 5.1:
https://samboy.github.io/MaraDNS/webpage/lunacy/
Now, I should probably explain why I’m using Lua 5.1 instead of the latest “official” version of Lua. Lua has an interesting history; in particular Lua 5.1 is the most popular version and the version which is most commonly used or forked against. Adobe Illustrator uses Lua 5.1, and Roblox uses a fork of Lua 5.1 called “luau”. LuaJIT is based on Lua 5.1, and other independent implementations of Lua (Moonsharp, etc.) are based on versions mostly compatible with Lua 5.1.
Lua 5.1 has a remarkably good security history, and of course I take responsibility for any security bugs in the Lua 5.1 codebase since I use the code with the relatively new coLunacyDNS server (Lua 5.1 isn’t used with the MaraDNS or Deadwood servers).
Lua 5.1 is used to convert documentation, but those scripts are run offline and the converted documents are part of the MaraDNS Git tree.It's important to look at the actual vulnerability at the context, and not just list any CVE which matches by version.
I have several libraries that I've written. Not one single serious security bug in them has been found since 1991. Granted, nobody uses my libraries...
Not to diminish your team's achievement! :D But it's important to contextualize claims like this with information about what your userbase looks like
For example, when the Ghost Domain Name DNS vulnerability was discussed, MaraDNS was audited and named (MaraDNS was immune to the security bug, for the record)
https://web.archive.org/web/20120304054959/https://www.isc.o...
The question is a matter of impact because of how used the software is.
Out of curiosty: what is the point you’re trying to make? That there are alternatives to dnsmasq? That somehow your software is “better”?
This plug provides zero value to the dnsmasq discussion.
As others have pointed out: the more used a software is, the more scrutiny it gets and more bugs or edge cases are found.
The main advantage of writing in C over Rust here in 2026 is that C has two different Lua interpreters, and there isn’t a port of Lua to Rust yet; [1] yes, there are ways to use the C version of Lua in Rust, but that’s different.
If I were to write a new server today, I could very well write it in Go, then use GopherLua for the Lua engine:
https://github.com/yuin/gopher-lua
Although, even here, the advantage of C is that I could increase performance by using LuaJIT:
https://luajit.org/luajit.html
[1] If I were to use Rust, I would consider using Rune as an embedded language as per https://rune-rs.github.io/
dnsmasq has served me well for like an eternity in multiple setups for different use cases. As all software it has bugs. And once located those get fixed. Its author is also easy to communicate with.
Why should I switch over to something way less proven? I'm quite sure your software also has bugs, many still not located. Maybe because it's less popular/ less well known nobody cares to hunt for those bugs? Which means even if the numbers of found bugs is less in your software at the moment, and it may look more audited for this reason, it may actually be way less secure.
Demonstrably some software has fewer bugs, and its authors are often hated, especially if they are a lone author like Bernstein. Because it must not happen!
Projects with useless churn and many bug reports are more popular because only activity matters, not quality.
Must they prove their software to you? They're offering an alternative, not bargaining for a deal.
I concur. The last part, however, is quite worrisome. Dnsmasq is ran by one person, published on their own git and I did not see any information about other maintainers.
It is a super important (and great, and useful, and everything) software and i have fears of what will happen one day.
Sure, someone can clone and push to github but it may seriously fragment the ecosystem.
The vast majority of vulnerabilities found recently are directly related to being written in memory unsafe languages, it's very difficult to justify that a DNS/DHCP server can't be written in rust or go and without using unsafe (well, maybe a few unsafe calls are still needed, but these will be a very small amount)...
It's supremely annoying when you run into arbitrary limits like that as a user. Often it's like a deliberate expiration date for the software as the world moves on to larger files/etc.
AI Security researchers at least do something. If it was so easy to rewrite everything in rust, I don't know why the response to this incidents isn't a rock solid replacement in rust, the next day.
I tell you why that is. Working on these things doesn't give you stars on github.
People seem to think that rewriting in rust just magically fixes all issues, but that's not how it works (See recent uutils CVEs). Rewrites tend to have more bugs because the code is new and hasn't been reviewed as much.
Go ahead and ask your AI to make it. What's stopping you?
why can't machine-learning write a product from scratch that is flawless?
Flawless software is hard for an LLM to write, because all the programs they have been trained on are flawed as well.
As a fun exercise, you could give a coding agent a hunk of non-trivial software (such as the Linux kernel, or postgresql, or whatever), and tell it over and over again: find a flaw in this, fix it. I'm pretty sure it won't ever tell you "now it's perfect" (and do this reproducibly).
Whatever the answer to that conundrum might be, LLMs are trained on these patterns and replicate them pretty faithfully.
The CVEs here have their fair share of silly C problems, but also more rigid input validation and handling. These more rigid validations exclude stuff which may even be valid by the spec, but entirely problematic in practice.
As examples, take a look how many valid XML documents are practically considered unsafe and not parsed, for example due to recursive entity expansion. This renders the parsers not flawless and in fact not in spec.
Or, my favorite bait - there should be a maximum length limit on passwords. Why would you ever need a kilobyte sized password?
DHCP and DNS are connected, PXE requires DHCP entries, so to do a simple setup you'd need to glue together at least 3 daemons otherwise, all with different config syntax
10/10, no regrets, would recommend.
Is that the Linux way you are on about? No obviously not 8)
I think you mean the "unix idealized but never really happened exactly but we are quite close if you squint a bit ... way" where each tool does one job well and the pipeline takes up the slack.
What else can they do, assuming the computers behind the router are all patched up.
It's definitely bad.
A lot of these systems that are getting hit, and will probably continue to be hit over the next few weeks or months, have a similar story. The Linux kernel's only other potentially viable choice was C++ at the time. OpenSSL, a perennial security offender, was started in 1998. You can look up your own favorite major system library with major security issues and it's probably the same story.
I'm as aggressive as anyone about saying "don't write a new project in C for network access", but cast me back to 1998 and I couldn't tell you what other viable choices there are either. There are safer languages, but they were much, much smaller than the C community, and I couldn't promise you how stable they were either. Java was out, and I don't know when to draw the exact line as to when it became a serious contender for a network server, but late 200Xs would be my guess; certainly what I saw in 1999 wasn't yet.
Example: I ran a Haskell network server in 2011 for something relatively unimportant and it fell over under conditions that would not have been very extreme for a production network; I know it was Haskell and not my code because I reused the same code base in 2013 with no changes in the core run loop and it did about 90% better; still not enough that I would have put that system into a real production use case but enough to show it wasn't my code failing. So while Haskell may have existed in the 200Xs, it wouldn't have qualified as a viable choice for a network server at the time.
There's a lot more viable choices today than there used to be.
Plus of course they are slower and bigger.
(mostly unrelated to topic at hand though)
Oh very much so! In my mind, it seems that someone must have figured out what the universe was for, and now it's been replaced with something even more bizarre and inexplicable.
I never understood why some projects get extremely popular and others don't. I also suspect by now that the reports by tools that are "too dangerous to release" scan all projects but selectively only contact those with issues, so that they never have to admit that their tool didn't find anything.
It's in popular projects.
It is a distorted view, because projects become popular by allowing indiscriminate commits, bugs, maintainers.
If I'd start a new project I'd allow anyone in and blog about 100 exploits every year, because that is exactly what people want. I'm serious.
Answer: no, but they're working on it.
https://forum.openwrt.org/t/dnsmasq-set-of-serious-cves/2500...
https://github.com/mirror/dd-wrt/issues/465
https://svn.dd-wrt.com/changeset/64944
https://svn.dd-wrt.com/changeset/64905
The release is "coming soon".
"a remote attacker capable of asking DNS queries or answering DNS queries can cause a large OOB write in the heap."
Malformed DNS response causes "infinite loop and dnsmasq stops responding to all queries."
Malicious DHCP request can cause buffer overlow.
Hopefully!
But, ai-deniers are telling us there is nothing to see ...
CVE-2026-2291 Heap buffer overflow, Infinite loop, Integer underflow, Heap buffer overflow ..
Welcome to the new world order.