> So, for example, it recently turned out to be possible for eavesdroppers to decrypt messages without a key, simply by tampering with encrypted messages. Most technologists who work with PGP don’t understand it at a low enough level to see what’s wrong with it.
without citation. Such a writing choice makes me pause.
[0] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurit...
I understood their claim to be about a bug in PGP. I did not interpret it as a reference to Efail, which was (IIRC) a misuse of PGP by certain email viewer. From the Efail paper:
> However, both
> S/MIME and PGP predate these developments and use
> no authentication at all (S/MIME) or do not strictly com-
> mit to the requirements of an AE, which makes them eas-
> ier to misuse (PGP).
IIRC, properly configured senders & receivers should fail the MAC check and should not attempt to display tampered HTML. This has been the default behavior in PGP for some time, but I am still sympathetic to PGP haters. It's a papercut machine.However, email encryption today is about not trusting your ESP (Email Service Provider) to not scan your email. It's about encrypting from your ESP to your client in a way that the ESP cannot see what is in the email.
Is ESP protection a mainstream concern? Yes. Is lack of encryption the biggest privacy issue with email? No. Does encrypting emails address a real concern? Yes for some.