(1) "intuitive knowledge" - whether or not you want to take "intuitive knowledge" as a type of knowledge (I don't think I would) is basically immaterial. The deductive-inductive framework dynamic is for reasoning frameworks, not knowledge. The reasoning frameworks are pointed in opposite directions. The deductive framework is inherited from rationalist tradition, it's premises are by definition arbitrary and cannot be justified, and information is perfect (excepting when you get rare truth values, like something being undecidable). Inductive/empirical framework is quite the opposite. Its premises are observations and absolutely not arbitrary, the information is wholly imperfect (by necessity, thanks Popper), and there is always a kind of adjustable resolution to any research conducted. Newton vs Einsteinian physics, for example, shows how zooming in on the resolution of experimentation shows how a perfectly workable model can fail when instruments get precise enough. I'll also note here that abduction is another niche reasoning framework, but is effectively immaterial to my point here.
(2) The Turing Test is not, and has never been, a philosophically rigorous test. It's effectively a pointless exercise. The literature about "philosophical zombies" has covered this, but the most important work here is Searle's "Chinese Room."
>The fact that AI seems to be able to (digitally) do anything we ask for is also very interesting.
I don't even know how to respond to this. It's trivially, demonstrably false. Beyond that, my entire point is that philosophy of language actually presents so hard problems with regards to what meaning actually is that might end up creating a kind of uncertainty principle to this line of thinking in the long run. Specifically Quine's indeterminacy of translation.
