And maybe more Enrons?
Note that FTX, for example, was privately held. If it had been born in the nineties, the norm would be for it to go public, and have at least a modicum of disclosure; staying private would have been weird, a red flag. Instead, "our generation's Enron" had no public markets oversight whatsoever, SOX or otherwise.
So yeah, it's necessary to find a balance. You are choosing between a little regulation on a lot of companies, or a lot of regulation on a smaller and smaller chunk of the economy each year.
Dare I say the special interests that ghost write the bulk of the text of any given legislation are specifically banking on those second and Nth order consequences.
It seems the private/public split along the lines of "public companies should be more scrutinized" worked as intended.
One could make the valid point that those pension funds shouldn't have been (indirectly) invested in those privately-owned unicorns to begin with, but doing that would have most probably come with opportunity costs for those pension funds (as for some reason or another private big companies have been seen as bringing in more money for each dollar spent compared to big public companies, at least when it comes to the last 8-10 years).
As the OP implies, there needs to be some sort of balance between public and private companies, each of them need to be, in effect, more like the other in the eyes of the State/taxman, State-run regulators and the like.
The people and venture funds that officially owned FTX were a narrower group, and I assume they were all qualified investors. But the thing about our disclosure regime is that protecting the official owners of the company is only one goal, the one that serves as the pretext. Informally, various regs on public companies are designed to bring sunlight more generally, and to prevent a wider array of crimes and shenanigans than just defrauding the company's owners. Public companies also have rules and norms around governance which, had FTX been been subject to them, would have made a difference.
> It seems the private/public split along the lines of "public companies should be more scrutinized" worked as intended.
Only if the intention was also, "...and public companies should be an ever-shrinking share of the economy". There are a number of reasons why one might not have intended that. Ordinary investors miss out on early growth, and the good side-effect of general sunshine and governance norms only covers a sliver of the economy, missing many of the most dynamic firms that could use some scrutiny.
