Absolutely.

But the history of code/data confusion attacks that you alluded to in GP isn’t an apples-to-apples comparison to the code/data confusion risks that LLMs are susceptible to.

Historical issues related to code/data confusion were almost entirely programmatic errors, not operational characteristics. Those need to be considered as qualitatively different problems in order to address them. The nitpicking around buffer overflows was meant to highlight that point.

Programmatic errors can be prevented by proactive prevention (e.g. sanitizers, programmer discipline), and addressing an error can resolve it permanently. Operational characteristics cannot be proactively prevented and require a different approach to de-risk.

Put another way: you can fully prevent a buffer overflow by using bounds checking on the buffer. You can fully prevent a SQL injection by using query parameters. You cannot prevent system crashes due to external power loss or hardware failure. You can reduce the chance of those things happening, but when it comes to building a system to deal with them you have to think in terms of mitigation in the event of an inevitable failure, not prevention or permanent remediation of a given failure mode. Power loss risk is thus an operational characteristic to be worked around, not a class of programmatic error which can be resolved or prevented.

LLMs’ code/data confusion, given current model architecture, is in the latter category.