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0 pointsmlsu8mo ago0 comments

> By definition, if that simulation has substantial properties, it isn't a simulation.

This is kind of a no-true-scotsman esque argument though, isn't it? "substantial properties" are... what, exactly? It's not a subjective question. One could, and many have, insist that fire that really burns is merely a simulation. It would be impossible from the inside to tell. In that case, what is fantasy, and what is reality?

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2 comments · 1 top-level

mjburgess8mo ago· 1 in thread

Define any property of interest. Eg., O = "reacting with oxygen"

S is a simulation of O iff there is an inferential process, P, by which properties of O can be estimated from P(S) st. S does not implement O

Eg., "A video game is a simulation of a fire burning if, by playing that game, I can determine how long the fire will burn w/o there being any fire involved"

S is an emulation model of O iff ...as-above.. S implements O (eg., "burning down a dollhouse to model burning down a real house").

mlsuOP8mo ago

If P successfully produces the relevant behaviors of O (burning, light, etc), then P is an implementation of O. There's no separate "real O" floating out there that P fails to capture. In other words, when you are playing the game, there _is_ fire involved.

You define a 'real' implementation to exclude computational substrate, then use the very same definition to prove that computational substrate cannot implement 'real' implementations. It's circular!

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