The nice thing about trusting just a latest-edition Intel CPU is that they're so far ahead of everyone else in process that most attacks would be technically difficult for anyone except Intel, NSA, etc. Chris Tarnovsky isn't going to be able to extract keys out of Intel E5 CPUs in 6 hours with even a 10x bigger than $1.5mm lab, so as long as you deal with a machine which disappears faster than 6h (rotating keys, releasing the hounds, etc.), you should be safe.
One of the few things (along with the takeover of mobile OSes vs. legacy crappy desktop OSes) which makes me hopeful for security.
But you can't use current generation Intel CPUs as devised by the GP since those (or rather their chipsets) come with embedded controllers (running updateable code signed by someone else) with way too much access to the hardware to be trustworthy.
To protect against malicious PCI devices use an IOMMU set up early (eg. while still running code from flash)
There are also facilities against hardware keyloggers, but with today's hardware integration, that's mostly a matter of physically locking down the notebook chassis.
TRESOR plus TreVisor or an equivalent hypervisor is a necessary but not sufficient step to protecting a virtual machine from the physical server hardware or server operator. You also need trusted EFI (coreboot), Intel TXT, and a separation kernel (of which there are ~3 DOD funded ones, and a few more.
http://www.xakep.ru/post/58104/ (use Google Transalte)
TL;DR
The author has found an undeclared software module (backdoor?) working as a hypervisor in the System Management Block chip on the South Bridge working with Intel CPU with VT virtualization technology.
The BIOS is probably the lowest hanging fruit for an attacker now. Most trusted boot doesn't even really check the BIOS in any real way, it starts sometime after the BIOS.
Just hope it doesn't get turned on its head for some yet-another layer of DRM that stops us from accessing our own content.
I guess (or hope) that seeding the key into the CPU in the first place is what's going to make it hard for content owners to use for DRM?