The original report was that submitting a message close to (but not quite) 1500 seconds to the audio transcription API would result in weird, unrelated, off-topic responses that look like they might be replies to someone else’s query. This is not what’s happening. Our API has a bug where if the tokenization of the audio (which is not strictly correlated with the audio length) exceeds a limit, the entire input is truncated, and the model effectively receives a blank query. We’re working with our API team to get this fixed and to produce more useful error messages.
When the model receives an empty query, it generates a response by selecting one random token, then another (which is influenced by the first token), and another, and so on until it has completed a reply. It might seem odd that the responses are coherent, but this is a feature of how all LLM's work - each token that comes before influences the probability for the next token, and so the model generates a response containing words, phrases, code, etc. in a way that appears humanlike but in fact is solely a creation of the model. It’s just that in this case, the output started in a random (but likely) place and the responses were generated without any input. Our text models display the same behavior if you send an empty query, or you can try it yourself by directly sampling an open source model without any inputs.
We took a while to respond to this. Our goal is to provide a reasonable response to reports. If you have found a security vulnerability, we encourage you to report it via our bug bounty program: https://bugcrowd.com/engagements/openai.
It seems like reporting bugs/issues via that program forces you to sign a permanent NDA preventing disclosures after the reported issue been fixed. I'm guessing the author of this disclosure isn't the only one that avoided it because of the NDA. Is that potentially something you can reconsider? Otherwise you'll probably continue to see people disclosing these things publicly and as a OpenAI user it sounds like a troublesome approach.
I believe the author was referring to the standard BugCrowd terms, which as far as I know are themselves fairly common across the various platforms. In my experience we are happy for researchers to publish their work within the normal guidelines you’d expect from a bounty program — it’s something I’ve worked with researchers on without incident.
A lot of AI products straight up have plan text logs available for everyone at the company to view.
I really hope they fix this bug and start taking security more seriously. Trust is everything.
Software quality is... Minimal now days.
A model like GPT-4o can hallucinated responses that are indistinguishable from real user interactions. This is easy to confirm for yourself: just ask it to make one up.
I’m certainly willing to believe OpenAI leaks real user messages, but this is not proof of that claim.
Right now there is no real proof, untill you confirm that the data it provided cannot be hallucinated (which could be not feisable).
Also, acknowledging the response fron OpenAI staff dismissing it, would you mind sharing PoC?
You can spot anyone using AI writing a mile away. It stopped saying "delve" but started saying stuff like "It's not X–it's Y" and "check out the vibes (string of wacky emoji)" constantly.
If the story in OP about getting a company's private financial data is true (i.e. the numbers are correct and nonpublic) that could be a smoking gun.
Either way it's a bad look for OpenAI to have not responded to this. Even if the resolution turns out to be that these are just hallucinations, it should've been investigated and responded to by now if OpenAI actually care about security.
> I am issuing this limited, non‑technical disclosure:
> No exploit code, proof‑of‑concept, or reproduction steps are included here.
Then why bother? I feel a bit cynical here, but if the goal is to get this fixed, they're not going to care unless it becomes a zero day and is given to the masses, otherwise it's going to quietly be exploitable by the few unsavory groups who know of it and will never be patched. Isn't the whole point of responsible disclosures to give them a time clock to get this situated before actual publication? Forgive me if I'm wrong, I haven't been in that field in a long time.For real? At least doesn't match the one on https://keybase.io/requilence
I could have actually gone to their office in person if I wanted to be pedantic but it actually seemed like a pretty weird office space lol.
The problem I have with it is that there's no way they could have determined if an API key was stolen or not, even to this day.
Basically, their docs (which seemed auto-generated) pointed to a domain they did not own (verified this). So if you ran any API examples you sent your keys to a 3rd party. I know because I did this. There's no way to know that the domain in the docs is simply wrong.
I tried explaining this to the support people, that I needed to talk with a software engineer but they kept stonewalling. I think it was fixed after 24 hours or so.
Massive security bug, well spotted. It's like Bank of America showing other people my transactions, or Meta leaking my WhatsApp messages.
This raises some serious questions about security.
I certainly wouldn't sign an indefinite NDA for a chance to win:
Average payout: $836.36
openai should be grateful, after all, they want all information to be free
Just to avoid yet another case of hallucinations outputs getting misinterpreted.