"Nothing true can be said about God from a posture of defense" isn't merely describing properties of statements like your examples do (word counts, colors). Instead, it's making a universal claim about POSSIBILITY itself, specifically, the impossibility of defensive true statements about God.
This raises a key question: What makes defensive truth claims about God impossible? This impossibility must stem from something about God's nature itself. Otherwise, what grounds the impossibility?
Your examples all involve contingent properties:
1) Book word counts are contingent features of books
2) color(X) = color(Y) involves contingent properties of objects
But the original statement makes a necessary claim about what kinds of truth claims about God are possible at all. This is fundamentally different because:
1) It rules out ALL possible defensive true statements about God 2) The basis for this universal impossibility must lie in God's nature 3) Therefore it necessarily makes a claim about God, not just about statements
This is why property inheritance examples don't apply here. The statement isn't claiming properties transfer between levels, it's making a universal claim about possibility itself that necessarily involves both statements about God AND God's nature.
While you've shown that descriptive properties don't transfer between meta-levels, this doesn't address the key issue: a claim about what statements about God are possible must ultimately be grounded in God's nature itself.
