Resources held in common have historically been subject to significant control via social, civic and legalistic processes. What is typically referred to as "a tragedy of the commons situation" never turns out to be what Hardin originally suggested - individuals taking advantage of the lack of controls. Instead it is invariably individuals who first dismantle the control systems in place in order to pursue their own selfish ends.
This matters because the "tragedy of the commons" concept has been used to suggest (successfully) that communities cannot manage commonly held resources, which is false. What is true is that communities frequently cannot manage a sustained attack by selfishness and greed against their own systems of management, and that's a very, very different problem.
My understanding is that overfishing and climate change are prime and valid examples of the tragedy of the commons.
You seem to be claiming that the problem is with systems of management, but the entire point of the tragedy of the commons is that it happens when there isn't management. Which is abundantly the case at the global level of international waters and a shared atmosphere, because there is no such thing as a world government, nor do most people want one.
So how exactly has there "never... been a tragedy of the commons"? How are overfishing and CO2 not exactly tragedies of the commons? What other principle explains why they weren't solved decades ago?
When so-called tragedies of the commons occur, it is invariably because someone has first attacked those systems of control to further their own ends. In the case of fishing, most traditional fishing communities and systems have objected to the arrival of industrial scale fishing, but they have been ignored and sidelined because of the interests of the owners of those new systems. So the problem is not that people/communities cannot manage resources held in common, it is that they cannot effectively resist power, wealth and greed if and when it arrives. But that very inability is also contingent on broader political and economic conditions, and is not inherent to the fact that the resources are held in common.
Climate change may well be the first true example of Hardin's original concept of "tragedy of the commons". It has a number of properties that traditional resource "extraction" behaviors do not share (including the invisibility of the problem until it is too late). But when people talk about "tragedy of the commons", they are typically referring to much smaller scale situations than the one(s) that have led us to where we are with climate change.
There's also a case to be made, given the remarkably early understanding of the consequences of fossil fuel utilization and the documented behavior of the companies involved, that climate change is precisely the type of failure I'm describing rather than the one Hardin did. We have systems of control for the things fossil fuel has negatively impacted, but people who became very, very, very, very rich from their use actively subverted and captured them for their own purposes.
I acknowledge that the shift is subtle: from the problem being "humans cannot manage resources held in common" to "human systems for managing resources held in common are frequently not robust enough to withstand selfishness and greed". Nevertheless, I think it is an important one.
You say 'There wasn't ever "a big sea full of fish and anyone could just do whatever they want".' But to the contrary, that's basically always been the case. Fishing boats were limited by technology and the size of their local markets, but once those limitations disappeared because of inevitable technological progress, then that's exactly what happened. And we see this happening especially with Chinese overfishing today.
You're claiming that supposed "systems of control" existed in the first place and then were attacked, but that seems entirely counterfactual to me. There was no system of control for a problem that technological progress hadn't created yet -- humans don't see that far enough into the future. And if four countries that border a sea want to limit fishing but a fifth one says I'm going to overfish as much as I want, well then what do you think is going to happen?
I don't see what benefit there is in attacking the concept of tragedy of the commons. It's not some kind of fatalistic viewpoint of what must happen (which you seem to be claiming -- "that people/communities cannot manage resources held in common"), but rather a warning of what will happen when resources aren't properly managed. Claiming the tragedy doesn't exist seems like it would only benefit the people who want to to exploit our shared resources. By recognizing its validity, we can do our best to create and improve systems of management (especially international systems) to prevent the tragedies from occurring.
Speaking of which, Elinor Ostrom's book, Governing the Commons, outlines the conditions for the successful management of a commons. Notably neither private ownership nor governmental control is ideal, the best outcomes are by cooperative organizations where those with a direct stake in the commons are the managers.
I don't understand why not. That's the literal definition of a commons in the political economy sense -- a public resource everyone can take from freely. (As opposed to a public resource that is managed via licenses, auctions, limits, etc.) On what basis would you not call them a commons, in political economy?
The entire point of the "tragedy of the commons" is the tragedy of overfishing, the tragedy of CO2 levels, because nobody is in charge of managing it.
>Lax maintenance and poor accessibility (remember, LA) made the park undesirable for families to visit.
>"Undesirables" began frequenting the park, as their chances of being harassed by police at the behest of the families who were no longer visiting was much lower.
So, what is commonly seen as a tragic outcome caused by individuals abusing resources is really a matter of authorities abusing their prerogative to hold or not hold to what could reasonably be considered their responsibilities.
For your examples: there are international laws and agreements that "govern" (maybe more like "suggest") best practices wrt fishing and carbon emissions, based on publicly-available research and inquiry. Further, the entities causing these issues aren't "free radicals"; they're mostly formally-incorporated organizations that are subject to state regulation and their own policies (which, when known by the public through their actions, are subject to public pressure - either wallet diplomacy or the threat of further regulation). It's a choice for the US government to not hold companies accountable, or to not ratify, say, the Kyoto Protocol, or to ignore studies on fishery health in favor of placating the fishing industry. Same for every other country. And every country has some ability to influence others through the shape of their relations. I suppose you could exclude pirates.
Tragedy of the commons assumes that individual actors haven't bound themselves together by some kind of expectation or obligation. The most authoritative version of that is government, of course, but you can have lesser agreements. In those cases, it's not merely a matter of individual entities abusing resources, but of flaunting self-imposed "management."
^This is the most important part of this comment, sorry for taking a while to get to it.
This is not my impression. I’ve always heard “tragedy of the commons” invoked precisely to advocate that commonly held resources must be regulated.
I kindly invite you to visit the kitchens of undergraduate house-shares. I think you may soon appreciate there are "tragedy of the commons" situations happening all the time :)
Just in the part of the world where I live, but inherited from the Arabic world via Spain, are the acequias of New Mexico. Contrary to US law, they hold water to be a communical resource, and are managed at the community level, typically with an individual elected to be the "majordomo" who make decisions about allocations but is constantly subject to input from and being overridden by the community itself. When acequias "go wrong" (i.e. there are water shortages), it is typically caused by some combination of:
1. an actual water shortage
2. poor decisions on the part of the majordomo
3. someone stealing from the system
What it almost never is: a "tragedy of the commons" as described by Hardin et al.
