> But I'm going to do so very slightly because I'm not shifting the expected value by very much
I think you're shifting it by a lot. If the government can post-hoc decide to invalidate patents because the holder is getting too successful, you are introducing a substantial impact on expectations and uncertainty. Your action is not taken in a vacuum.
> Meanwhile I'm going to greatly increase the investment into the existing technology we already have, and allow many more people to try to improve upon it, and I'm going to argue the benefits greatly outweigh the costs.
I think this is a much more speculative impact. Why will people even fund the improvements if the government might just decide they've gotten too large a slice of the pie later on down the road?
> the trade-off I get for this is that society gets the benefit of the same actually happening in the future and us not being hamstrung by unbreachable monopolies.
No the trade-off is that materially less is produced. These incentive effects are not small. Take for instance, drug price controls - a similar post-facto taking because we feel that the profits from R&D are too high. Introducing proposed price controls leads to hundreds of fewer drugs over the next decade [0] - and likely millions of premature deaths downstream of these incentive effects. And that's with a policy with a clear path towards short-term upside (cheaper drug prices). Discounted GPUs by invalidating nvidia's patents has a much more tenuous upside and clear downside.
[0]: https://bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/voices.uchicago.edu/dist/d/312...
