Odds are the US and Europe will never enjoy the comparative advantage Taiwan has in the semiconductor supply chain.
What does that mean? One of the west’s key strategic advantages is the ability to lead in frontier compute technologies. China, in addition to rapidly working its way up the value chain and nodes, can easily mitigate much of this advantage if it deems the calculus worthwhile. It need only disrupt Taiwan and basically all leading edge fab capacity is off the table. Outside of the work Intel is doing, the US does not have leading edge fabs.
We do not have the skilled workforce or supply chain to take advantage of leading edge fabs.
Why is this situation with Taiwan so difficult to unwind? In the West there is a fantasy that if war breaks out, we will just load all the Taiwanese onto a starship and bring them over to the US where they will happily resume their work in OUR fabs. But they don’t want that. They want their home and ideals to be defended, and they’re willing to do the work… from their soil.
The reality is the fabs are bargaining chip with the West, far better than any iron dome. The question becomes, how did we get in this position? And the answer is deliberately. The US saw putting semiconductor production in Taiwan and a way to reduce cost and challenge the Japanese, but also a way to imbed incentives into our foreign policy for protection of tenuous Taiwanese democracy and independence.
We have known this for a very very long time.