This #2, so-called "Private Cloud Compute", is not the same as iCloud. And certainly not the same as sending queries to OpenAI.
Quoting:
“With Private Cloud Compute, Apple Intelligence can flex and scale its computational capacity and draw on larger, server-based models for more complex requests. These models run on servers powered by Apple silicon, providing a foundation that allows Apple to ensure that data is never retained or exposed.“
“Independent experts can inspect the code that runs on Apple silicon servers to verify privacy, and Private Cloud Compute cryptographically ensures that iPhone, iPad, and Mac do not talk to a server unless its software has been publicly logged for inspection.”
“Apple Intelligence with Private Cloud Compute sets a new standard for privacy in AI, unlocking intelligence users can trust.”
iOS won't send any data to a PCC that isn't running a firmware that's been made public in their transparency logs and compute nodes have no way to be debugged in a way that exposes user data[1]
And at the end of the day, this is going to give the warrant holder a handful of requests from a specific user? Why wouldn't they use that same warrant to get onto the target's device directly and get that same data plus a ton more?
0: https://help.apple.com/pdf/security/en_US/apple-platform-sec... 1: https://security.apple.com/blog/private-cloud-compute/
Apple's thrown stones come back to hunt their glass ceiling.
Once the data is out of your possession it's out of your control.
Drow "nation state is after me" from the threat model and you'll be a lot happier.
Actually, once your e2e key that encrypts your data is out of your possession, it's out of your control.
Over the past decade it's become commercially feasible to be NSL-proof.
But in summary 1. The servers run on Apple Silicon hardware which have fancier security features 2. Software is open source 3. iOS verifies that the server is actually running that open source software before talking to it 4. This is insane privacy for AI
The security features are meant to prevent the server operator (Apple) from being able to access data that's being processed in their farm. The idea is that with that + E2E encryption, it should be way closer to on-device processing in terms of privacy and security
Furthermore how private do you think Siri is? Their privacy policy explicitly states they send transcripts of what you say to them. That cannot be disabled.
Ten minutes ago i set up a new Apple device and it not only asked me if I wanted to enable Siri, but whether I wanted to contribute audio clips to improve it. What, exactly, cannot be disabled?
"When you use Siri, your device will indicate in Siri Settings if the things you say are processed on your device and not sent to Siri servers. Otherwise, your voice inputs are sent to and processed on Siri servers. In all cases, transcripts of your interactions will be sent to Apple to process your requests."
It's pretty clear and not in dispute that your transcripts are always sent to Apple.
Those that won’t use those won’t use this either.
Apple has taken a markedly different approach, and has done so for years - E2E encryption, hashing and segmenting routes on maps, Secure Enclave, etc.
While I think it’s perfectly reasonable to “trust no one”, and I fully agree that there may be things we don’t know, I don’t think there it’s reasonable to put Apple on the same (exceedingly low) level as Google.
Apples motives are different, selling premium hardware and MORE premium hardware, they wouldn't dare fuck that up, their nestegg is hardware and slowly more services tied to said hardware ecosystem (icloud subs, tv subs etc). Hence the privacy makes sense to pull people into the ecosystem.
Google... everything google does even phones, is for more data gathering for their advertising revenue.
Apple's business model is to entice people into a walled garden ecosystem where they buy lots of expensive hardware sold on high margins. They don't need user data to make this work, which is why they can more comfortably push features like end-to-end and no-knowledge encryption.
I think also a bunch of people will trust Apple’s server more (but not completely) than other third parties.