What do you mean?
So the continental balance was Germany vs France and whatever minnows France could gather, USSR as wild card. Germany being potentially much stronger than France when it rearms (In the road to WW2, Germany managed to woo USSR and weaken/divide the minnows further).
The Versailles treaty was enough to piss off Germany but didn't offset its strategic gains to the East. France wasn't strong enough to enforce alone.
So what were the alternatives to Versailles? There were two other options (A/B) and a useful extra (C):
A. Be way meaner to Germany so the balance of power on the continent shift and let France enforce this.
B. Pull in France to an alliance system and have UK/US as enforces.
C. Somehow create a balancing force to the East/South of Germany rather than bickering minnows.
France wanted A and was fine with C. This was consistent leaving aside moral debates. Perhaps it could have been convinced to get B instead of A if UK/US actually made decent assurances.
UK strategic thought always sought to divide the continent, which means post-WW1 relations with France cooled (it mistakenly viewed Germany as weaker). This was an impediment to A and the background to Keynes' outbursts of nonsense. It didn't like alliances (B) but would have have C.
The US couldn't abide with any version of C (fourteen points etc.) and was pulled by UK regarding A. B really needed something much stronger than League of Nations which US opinion could not abide.
Result was a strategically incoherent treaty, which France/UK/US pushing in different directions, but it wasn't actually a punishing treaty but rather a mild treaty.
P.S. The late Sally Marks had a lot of excellent writing on these issues.
Why?
* France was bled white, moreso than Germany. German population was higher.
* Germany won its eastern front, so France couldn't rely on as strong allies next time.
* The noted strength of German industry (mostly unaffected by that war).
