Yeah I hate that people can't acknowledge that friction is sometimes intentional.

Not everything -should- be easy.

For example I designed a system at a previous company that used Shamir's Secret Sharing to protect a very very important root key. We used an intermediate of this key for most operations but it came time to rotate it and folks were surprised by the ceremony involved in doing so.

i.e the root key was decrypted using X of N members of the SSS group, a new intermediate generated and the special NUC that was designed for this purpose returned to it's safe (which was also using a Yubikey as like a mini-HSM too).

Those keys protected very important PII and I deemed this the minimum necessary friction, ideally I would have went further if that was tenable.

Some things really should be hard and that hardness should be proportional to how horrible the implications of someone unauthorized doing that thing.

In how many instances over the last 10 years has a country code TLD for a country of New Zealand's size or greater been stolen? It doesn't make sense to talk about benefits without costs, and vice versa. Error-prone and dangerous security demands urgent problems. Is TLD hijack one of them? It is not.