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0 pointsdgoodell2y ago0 comments

I think you read Boeing engineer's post a bit too quickly, because that's definitely not quite what it said.

That said, I worked in commercial aircraft engine component repair for years and everything I read in this is 100% plausible to me.

One time we shipped a part back to the customer before it was even done being repaired. It had labels and stickers marking stuff that needed to be done still on it. When the customer got it they emailed us some photos of the markings and said "It doesn't look done to us...". We had to tell them to send it back so we could finish it. Whoops!

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mardifoufs2y ago· 2 in thread

What did I get wrong? I read his two comments but it's very possible I misunderstood something.

I agree that the situation you are describing is very plausible. But correct me if I'm wrong but he's saying that Boeing knew (as in, their systems were aware) about it, even after the botched repair that there was no bolt. In this case, it would be closer to the customer knowing the repair wasn't done and still going forward with not sending it back. No checks are done even after malicious actions from spirit:

>the reason the door blew off is stated in black and white in Boeings own records. It is also very, very stupid and speaks volumes about the quality culture at certain portions of the business

>This entire sequence is documented in the SAT, and the nonconformance records in CMES address the damaged rivets and pressure seal, but at no point is the verification job reopened, or is any record of removed retention bolts created, despite it this being a physical impossibility. Finally with Spirit completing their work to Boeing QAs satisfaction, the two rivet-related records in CMES are stamped complete, and the SAT closed on 19 September 2023. No record or comment regarding the retention bolts is made.

To me that's just hard to believe. Errors happen, but this involves fraud from spirit and also just no process at all from Boeing. I get that the system that deals with this for the 737 is apparently bad, but this just very very basic process management (aka step y needs to be done so that step x can be marked as started or confirmed). In this case, Spirit earlier lied about repairing it, then still didn't repair it... for reasons (hard to procure parts for a manufacturer is an... odd reason to just not fix a critical part especially since it would mean that they actively decided to not install the missing parts). And Boeing caught it the first time but then stopped caring the second? Idk, possible, but I'll wait for sure for more info before drawing conclusions

novaleaf2y ago

in the anonymous post the eng mentions that the plug has to lift up before coming out. so it could sit there, unbolted yet pressurized for a while.

the quote:

> there are 4 bolts that prevent the mid-exit door plug from sliding up off of the door stop fittings that take the actual pressurization loads in flight

mardifoufs2y ago

Sure, but that would still be a worlds first basically. It's not an incorrect install, it's intentionally not doing it and then lying about it. For a random seat related fixture, sure. But withholding critical parts in manufacturing just because you don't want to wait and do a more involved rebuild basically hasn't ever happened in aviation. It's not just short sighted and it's basically impossible for a single individual to have done this and sweep it under the rug. It would involve quite a few people from Spirit to sign off on it and sign their ticket directly to jail because they didn't want to wait. And then openly lying about it to Boeing at first by "painting over the parts", admitting to that lie, and then just not do it even if it's documented that they haven't done it.

I mean sure maybe but at best I'd guess the comment is based on the truth but with heavy hyperbole. And no matter what is said about Boeing, they still have in house inspectors and Qa. Even the laziest QA with no process management other than a spreadsheet would've caught this or raised a red flag. Would've also been believable if QA was overridden by management or something, but nope, nothing was raised according to the comment

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