An input addressed derivation’s hash is based on the the hash of all its input derivations and its own derivation. Therefore trusting the association between the cached binary and the derivation requires trusting the builder and a signature. All non-derivation inputs like source code, must be content-addressed.
A content addressed derivation can then be produced easily by rewriting all the derivations with `nix make-content-addressed`. This doesn’t require trust / signatures as every stage of the build is now content-addressed. The final hash could be confirmed through social consensus of multiple distrusting parties.
There’s nothing in theory stopping you from starting with a content addressed derivation other than it being a pain in the ass as you’d have to know the output hash before you built it, or TOFU (trust on first use) it which is then just the same as using the `nix make-content-addressed` approach.
I’m not sure why you think commit signatures are required. Git is content addressed, you can’t tamper with the derivations without changing the hashes and nixpkgs is primarily developed through GitHub. If someone has access to your SSH keys or GitHub account password it stands to reason they’d have access to your GPG keys too.