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0 pointsmattwilsonn8882y ago0 comments

Yes, but take this to the extreme and you have nodes who do not wish to censor literally fighting to get to censored, paying users.

The more the censored transactions build up, the easier it is for any honest node to swoop in, outpace the attacker and earn the rewards. And then those users now have a node who is willing to include their data - the incentive structure leads to these connections.

The point is that nodes who censor are giving up money to anyone else willing to include the data.

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charcircuit2y ago· 2 in thread

>any honest node to swoop in

Due to the Sybil attack honest nodes do not get to or it gets hard to even know about the transactions.

mattwilsonn888OP2y ago

Addressed this in our other thread.

Short answer is that as such activity continues the incentives to compete by behaving less duplicitously also increase - that may mean unorthodox means of finding those users in extreme attack scenarios like your example tends towards - but in basic cases there are proofs nodes can provide of previous performance which can't be Sybilled.

charcircuit2y ago

>incentives to compete by behaving less duplicitously also increase

There are no disincentives to do it and people may want to do it regardless of any incentives that are in place. There being transactions that are illegal to relay (money laundering), so legally nodes are unable to relay no matter the incentives.

>that may mean unorthodox means of finding those users

This has poor usability. Normal users don't want to deal with manually finding nodes themselves. It is hard to figure out the reputation of nodes when their is no hard proof of who the actual owner is.

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