> e.g. Signal used to do interesting things server-side using (now no-longer trusted, ironically) Intel SGX/TXT
Because this is the "snake oil" prong of its failure -- and why it's no longer trusted.
> Android Protected Confirmation
This could be implemented without any vendor keys. You associate the user's own key with the user's account.
> Attestation keys are usually per-device, so if indeed only one device gets compromised at great attacker expense, it's usually possible for a scheme to recover.
That's assuming it matters at that point. The attacker doesn't care if you revoke the keys after they steal your money.
And once they extract a key from one device, they have a known working procedure to get more. For non-software extraction most of the expense is the equipment which they'd still have from the first one.
> If all devices just systematically leak their keys as has certainly happened in the past, that won't help, of course.
And is likely to happen in the future, so any design that makes the assumption that it will not happen is clearly flawed.