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0 pointscpgxiii3y ago0 comments

My point is that multi-service aircraft are entirely possible, and have been all along. That several notable aircraft emerged as multi-service aircraft is all the more evidence that a multi-service aircraft (really, a family of tightly related aircraft) can be designed as such. The reason there are more USN->USAF success stories is that it is much easier to design an aircraft with the stresses of carrier operation in mind than it is to navalize a entirely ground-based design, and it is much easier for the USN to make the case politically that a USAF aircraft "can't possibly meet their requirements" than the reverse.

The USAF and USN are just incredibly unwilling to have to compromise to work with each other, and for most of the cold war had the budgets and supplier diversity to acquire entirely separately.

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indymike3y ago

> The USAF and USN are just incredibly unwilling to have to compromise

I don't think that is the case. The issue is that most of the joint programs fail because they start with such a broad difference in requirements the program can't work. Here are two examples:

F-111/TFX - Navy wanted a fleet interceptor / air superiority fighter built around the Phoenix Missile. Air Force wanted a heavy attack aircraft. The F-111 led to the Navy having to do a crash development to get the F-14 Tomcat.

F-16 LWF - Navy wanted a twin engine. AF wanted single engine. Joint program died immediately... so we the taxpayers ended up with the USAF buying F-16 (great aircraft) and the Navy ordering an update on the YF-17 which became the F/A-18 Hornet (another great aircraft). Incidentally, the YF-17 was a twin engine iteration of the F-5 (which is an iteration of the T-38 Talon), and the F/A-18 is an iteration of the YF-17.

> for most of the cold war had the budgets and supplier diversity to acquire entirely separately.

I think you are on to something: lack of supplier diversity will be a forcing function in the future...

cpgxiiiOP3y ago

> The issue is that most of the joint programs fail because they start with such a broad difference in requirements the program can't work.

Agreeing on requirements is the most important compromise. You can always come up with different requirements that make collaboration impossible. Sometimes these differing requirements are fundamental - e.g. the E-2 and E-3 (E-7 in the future), while performing similar roles, are necessarily very different platforms - that a joint program would never be considered. Sometimes these requirements are not so fundamental - e.g. the many years of single-engine versus twin-engine disagreement - that a joint program is possible, albeit challenging.

While the JSF program has had plenty of issues, the fact that it has been successful in delivering the envisioned aircraft is a testament to (a) technology improving to the point that many once-dealbreaker requirements (e.g. single-engine) could be swept aside, (b) the rise in costs making it clear that completely separate development programs were impractical, and (c) explicitly providing requirements flexibility via the "family-of-aircraft" approach (no way the F-35C would have been acceptable financially to anyone other than the USN, no way the F-35A would have been suitable for carrier use).

> ...lack of supplier diversity will be a forcing function in the future...

The consolidation of the 90s and 2000s is directly the consequence of lower budgets. Consider the fighter/strike fleets of the 1980s:

- USAF: A-7 (LTV), A-10 (FR), F-4 (MD), F-15 (MD), F-16 (GD), F-111 (GD), F-117 (Lockheed)

- USN: A-6 (Grumman), A-7 (LTV), F-4 (MD), F-14 (Grumman), F/A-18 (MD)

versus today:

- USAF: A-10 (none), F-15 (Boeing), F-15E (Boeing), F-16 (LM), F-22 (LM), F-35A (LM)

- USN: F/A-18E/F (Boeing), F-35C (LM)

there's just not enough business to support much more than the Boeing/LM duopoly keeping both production/support running and enough capability to be competitive for the NGAD programs.

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