This wouldn't have been solved by any thing in Dodd-Frank. SVB invested in highly liquid securities that are considered the safest asset class, interest rate risk wasn't expected to materialize as quickly as it did as the Fed would have been expected to raise rates more gradually over a longer time horizon or provide an asset exchange mechanism for member banks. SVB is not an example of a bank that had engaged in Investment Banking activity with depositor capital or had unacceptable capital reserve ratios.

That being said, I could be wrong and not aware of the specific Dodd-Frank policy that, if followed, would have made SVB safer.

The fed doesn't need to lower rates necessarily, it could simply allow all member banks to exchange low interest rate long term bonds for new higher yield bonds and pay the Fed for the spread with a loan. That would reduce the liquidity risk if the member bank needs to sell some or all of its bond portfolio on short notice to fund depositor withdrawals, it would allow the Fed to hold the low rate securities to maturity while being fairly compensated by member banks.

Edit: after reading this article posted by lordfrito below I stand corrected. SVB executives knew the risk and took it anyway. But not for personal gain but to maximize firm value as it allowed higher profit which increased the valuation (so yes they benefited personally, but to a greater extent than just a few million in bonuses).

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-13/svb-failu...