Maybe the premise of my question is about an entirely different misunderstanding then. There is a locus of control issue, and a story about how the original permissions model of GitHub Actions was chronically broken.
It's "pull_request_target" that I'm thinking of:
https://github.blog/2020-08-03-github-actions-improvements-f...
> In order to protect public repositories for malicious users we run all pull request workflows raised from repository forks with a read-only token and no access to secrets. This makes common workflows like labeling or commenting on pull requests very difficult.
> In order to solve this, we’ve added a new pull_request_target event, which behaves in an almost identical way to the pull_request event with the same set of filters and payload. However, instead of running against the workflow and code from the merge commit, the event runs against the workflow and code from the base of the pull request. This means the workflow is running from a trusted source and is given access to a read/write token as well as secrets enabling the maintainer to safely comment on or label a pull request.
That's the user story I was thinking of. Completely unrelated to the default branch issue that GP was describing, I guess.