No, it didn't, at least in any way which anyone who is qualified for even an entry-level position in any diplomatic service on Earth would mistake for a binding commitment even on the then-current administration, much less indefinitely into the future. (The most commonly cited statement on this is actually a reference to deployment of troops within United Germany in the near term post-unification, and the second most commonly cited does refer to NATO expansion but is a communication of items that could be on the table for discussion if Russia was willing to come to the table on German unification, not a commitment; but there also some claims that some other private communication not reduced to a binding international agreement occurred.)
If it had made such a promise to the USSR in a binding way, we could discuss, based on the specific form of the agreement and the subsequent diplomatic action relevant to it after the fall of the USSR whether it was still binding between any parties and which nation or nations were the USSR’s successors in interest and what were the legal effects were of any potential disunity between those parties.
But since it didn't, the whole set of questions is moot.
> and then immediately reneged on it
NATO expansion to Eastern European nations beyond the former East Germany didn't occur until 1999, which is not “immediately” after an event alleged to have happened in 1990.
Oh yeah? From the former Ambassador to Soviet Union (1987-1991), Jeff Matlock [1]:
>One persistent U.S. demand is that Ukraine’s territorial integrity be restored. Indeed, the U.S. is party to the Budapest Memorandum in which Russia guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity in return for Ukraine’s transfer of Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction in accord with U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. What the U.S. demand ignores is that, under traditional international law, agreements remain valid rebus sic stantibus (things remaining the same).
>When the Budapest memorandum was signed in 1994 there was no plan to expand NATO to the east and Gorbachev had been assured in 1990 that the alliance would not expand. When in fact it did expand right up to Russia’s borders, Russia was confronted with a radically different strategic situation than existed when the Budapest agreement was signed.
What annoys me about this discussion is that people continue to say none of this matters because there wasn't a treaty signed with Soviet Union - an entity that does not exist anymore - and this somehow means that anything said in the past also doesn't matter. It certainly matters in the minds of people escalating things in Eastern Ukraine right now. So it certainly isn't "moot". How in the world is that question "moot" if it's the driving reason behind Russia's perspective in this? You can disagree with Russia's security perspective, and that's fine. But to just toss out the NATO expansion as "moot" is both historically inaccurate, and borders on deliberately ignorant as if Russia is not allowed its own security concerns in the first place.
There's several other dimensions of this discussion that aren't happening at all - e.g. what NATO is even supposed to be doing in the 21st century 30 years after its raison d'être evaporated, what continued maintenance of American Empire in Europe means for both Europe and the United States and whether that's really in everyone's best interest, and how the alliance actually stacks up against a recalcitrant China in the Pacific Theater or if it is really even charted to do that - because we're so obsessed with Russia for reasons that are probably best left unstated for now. Inb4 I get accused of "apologizing" for Russia's actions here, I'm not. What they're doing is imo a long-term strategic blunder that will cost lives in the near-term. It's also wrong that the default position in the West right now is "Russia's concerns aren't legitimate QED".
[1] https://www.krasnoevents.com/uploads/1/1/6/6/116679777/krasn...
edit: grammar
>When the Budapest memorandum was signed in 1994 there was no plan to expand NATO to the east and Gorbachev had been assured in 1990 that the alliance would not expand. When in fact it did expand right up to Russia’s borders, Russia was confronted with a radically different strategic situation than existed when the Budapest agreement was signed."
And this gives Russia permission to invade a sovereign nation? Ukraine's independence is not just a matter of the Budapest Memorandum, it's a matter of the wishes of the Ukrainian people who have wanted independence from Russia for centuries, something many Russians don't want to acknowledge.
So far, NATO has not invaded Russia or violated its territorial sovereignty but Russia has violated the borders of multiple boarder states, so it's a bit rich for Putin to complain about NATO when he's clearly just trying to reincorporate border states that were conquered by the Tzars.
Nowhere did I suggest this, and Matlock does not even imply it in his essay. I was pretty clear that the problem I have with this discussion at this point. To put it bluntly: we will get nowhere with diplomacy if our line continues to be "your concerns are fake and made up, so do what we tell you". That's the attitude I see in here, in MSM, and from politicians (mostly in the US). Russia needs to be punished for what they're doing, but I want to see an end to these conflicts. The greatest geopolitical blunder since the end of WWII is the utter failure of the West to come to terms with and reintegrate Russia into a joint-security sphere after the fall of communism and Soviet Union. It's bigger than the Iraq War even, since Russia actually does have nukes.
>...it's a matter of the wishes of the Ukrainian people who have wanted independence from Russia for centuries
Some of these people in Ukraine are hardcore neo-Nazis, and we are giving them weapons. Some a genuine I'm sure, and I haven't been to Ukraine, and only have a few friends from there. So it's hard for me to gauge exactly how genuine any of this is given how toxic coverage of anything even tangentially related to Russia is in the West.
NATO's raison d'être evaporated? Pretty sure Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland (at a minimum) don't agree with that. It's the same it's always been - keep Russia from marching west across Europe. A bunch of countries in Europe still think that's important, and that it needs a credible military force to accomplish it. Russia's actions in Georgia and Ukraine do not give warm feelings of security to small countries on Russia's periphery.
How can you even say this with a straight face as Russia invades neighboring countries? You know why Russia doesn't attempt this land grab with NATO countries? NATO.
Russia has no interest in invading NATO countries. It wants to maintain national security.
NATO raison d’être was providing a shared framework for European security and preventing another general war in Europe, largely by tying West Germany into a durable common framework with other European powers.
It would be rendered redundant if replaced with a common EU security framework, but not by the collapse of Soviet bloc.
>It would be rendered redundant if replaced with a common EU security framework, but not by the collapse of Soviet bloc.
I've seen this repeated in a dozen different places, and I can't parse what it even means. Alliances come and go. That's just the normal course of history.
> How in the world is that question "moot" if it's the driving reason behind Russia's perspective in this? You can disagree with Russia's security perspective, and that's fine. But to just toss out the NATO expansion as "moot" is both historically inaccurate, and borders on deliberately ignorant as if Russia is not allowed its own security concerns in the first place.
This has nothing to do with Russia security, or would you think that the UN would attack Russia? Its a defense organization.
The mistake people make is thinking its a country like France or Germany, but just a bit different. You need to understand that Russia is ruled by a gang of oligarchs and has nothing that functionally resembles the institutions we take for granted. Putin gets what he wants from the parliament, even unanymously when he wants that. There are no laws for Putin and his crownies, the law applies only to his enemies. The Russia state is a strange amalgamation of intelligence (Puting rose to power from the KGB) and a small group of extremely powerful oligarchs. Then there are layers of smaller oligarchs below that one that run deeper layers of corrupt officials. Its bribery and theft all over the place, its a hugely dysfunctional state. Independent/foreign media outlets have been expelled or terminated, many Russians don´t consume the news anymore. Trust has been lost.
That something horrible would rise from the ashes of Stalins dystopia is not entirely unexpected, but still there are aspects that are really unnerving, like the fact that organised crime runs through all the state affairs, and some oligarchs run even private armies (read up on Wagner for instance). The state kills, tortures and poisons anyone that stands in its way.
Putin needs to feed this whole gang, and the oligarchs take the majority of the economic output for themselves. The economy is segregated. Russians are poor. Russia (like any autocratic state) is severely lacking development, it main income is the export of raw materials like gas and oil. Its BNP is the same as that of the Benelux countries. Mind boggling poverty. The trouble with this system is the same, it eats everything at home and it needs to find food outside of its door. Thats why you see Russia taking control of neighboring countries, appointing pro-russia puppets to scavenge them. You see the same with Belarus, its president lost control as the people revolted, ran to Putin to keep him in power and thus handing Putin the keys. It is a total surrender. Now that Russia has an even firmer grip, this country will soon be sliced up among the oligarchs.
The people of Ukrain voted to join the EU, it has been doing the needed reforms for a functional democratic country with rule of law. It has been weighting down on Ukrain oligarchs. The economic ties with the Kremlin were weakening and trade started to shift to the EU. Ukrain was making real progress, and the people turned out to be not wanting in the Russian influence.
That is the moment Putin annexed Crimea and started a war that is taking 8 years already. And is not enough. And if you listened closely yesterday, it will never be enough.
The majority of the proxy states around Russia would rather join the West. Putin cant handle a democratic success scenario in one of the former Soviet occupied territories, it has already to handle enough civil unrest in its proxy states.
The whole NATO argument is bullshit, the buffer idea doesn't even make sense in modern militarily reality. Its PR from the Kremlin and its highly effective. Unfortunately.
This system needs to grab economic output from other nations, and will keep doing so. There is only hope for Russian people if the Kremlin is going down, its getting worse there as it always does for autocracy in the end. This never ends well.
