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0 pointszepto4y ago0 comments

> make it illegal to offer E2E encryption without this backdoor.

It isn’t a back door to E2E encryption. It can’t even be used to search for a specific image on a person’s device.

It could be used possibly to find a collection of images that are not CSAM but are disliked by the state, assuming Apple is willing to enter into a conspiracy with NCMEC.

0 comments

_jn4y ago

It seems that Apple does not need to be a co-conspirator, and that it would be sufficient if someone added ‘malicious’ hashes to the NCMEC database.

zeptoOP4y ago

Not correct. When enough images to trigger a match are detected apple employees verify the visual derivative to make sure it matches before an alert is generated. They would need to collude.

_jn4y ago

You’re right, I was thinking about a breach of privacy in general instead of actual legal consequences. (Though the possibility of governments backdooring Apple’s servers to access decrypted files stands, that shouldn’t make a difference with this iCloud-Photos-only spyware)

j / k navigate · click thread line to collapse

0 pointszepto4y ago0 comments

> make it illegal to offer E2E encryption without this backdoor.

It isn’t a back door to E2E encryption. It can’t even be used to search for a specific image on a person’s device.

It could be used possibly to find a collection of images that are not CSAM but are disliked by the state, assuming Apple is willing to enter into a conspiracy with NCMEC.

0 comments

_jn4y ago

It seems that Apple does not need to be a co-conspirator, and that it would be sufficient if someone added ‘malicious’ hashes to the NCMEC database.

zeptoOP4y ago

Not correct. When enough images to trigger a match are detected apple employees verify the visual derivative to make sure it matches before an alert is generated. They would need to collude.

_jn4y ago

j / k navigate · click thread line to collapse