Sometimes I feel like the idea is just to kill productivity.
They kill productivity in exchange for job security.
I have argued that the raison d'etre of security policy is to ensure the existence and continuity of an environment in which work can get done. I've been told about the importance of the C.I.A triad and other things as though they were refutations of my point, often in tones of voice implying an attitude that this not-security|compliance-tech-is-incapable-of-knowing-what-he's-talking-about-and-therefore-can-be-ignored. I counter-argue that C.I.A et. al. are not refutations of my thesis, but in fact support it. If you can't ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information or systems for yourself or your customers, you do not, and/or will not, have an environment in which work can get done.
So, for the love of getting shit done, stop masturbating with broad and blind application of checklists, and take the time to sit down, really look at what you're trying to do and why, and develop actually useful risk models. And then develop security policies against those risk models. Yes checklists and various standards are useful tools that can help you cover a lot of common stuff, but are not the whole picture.
If your SSO isn't, use a good password manager.
Admin access for devs should be audited, and devs should understand that now they need some opsec. Like, separate work and personal machines; if not physically, at least use a different account, better yet, a VM.
To say nothing about adding suspicious email / IM attachments.
Remember, devs: you are a potential attack vector, a very efficient one.
