That question deserves additional attention if these flows reach processes controlled by different people, or are running under different privileges. That’s when they cross a trust boundary.
So a db server with local storage: single trust boundary around db and storage. But! But! What about the kernel!?
At this point it becomes important ask to another question: does the current abstraction level of the model help you think better about risk? It depends. Perhaps not if the db is part of a larger infrastructure with a global CDN, loadbalancers, webservers and some in memory caching layer.
The font differs, as usual, significantly between platforms and browsers though. Is it possible that you have poor black levels and maybe an overly blurred font rendition?
Astigmatism could also contribute here, as it leads to lines in certain orientations (e.g. vertical) being harder to distinguish than others—this can severely limit font legibility.
The orange on gray has a 2.5:1 contrast ratio, the main body text (dark gray on gray) is 4.1:1, both of which are below the WCAG 2.1 AA accessibility minimum of 4.5:1
https://mastodon.social/@slipstream/99116564964787956
> So, there's a Chinese botnet package known as "Destroyer" (破坏者). It, ironically, can itself be destroyed, thanks to a stack buffer overflow. I wasn't able to get full RCE, but a jump to "call ExitProcess" should be enough, no? It can be triggered directly after "start DDoS", for even more lulz.
> Here's the exploit: https://gist.github.com/Wack0/d0aa7f56d5d044fb918056207d2149...
> The C2 for this shitty chinese skiddie ddos-botnet has a stack buffer overflow in the parsing of packet opcode 3. This opcode is used for sending ddos-stats, so it only works when a packet with opcode 6 (start-ddos) is sent to us.
> Unfortunately, two addresses are written to before returning; these addresses get clobbered, and the C2 binary is compiled with an ancient compiler (VC++6 lol). No null bytes, so we can only overwrite two addressses, one of which has to be the return address... We can get eip control via SEH, but the full packet buffer is too far away on the stack for us to be able to jump to a ROP chain :(
> So the best we can do here is return to "call ExitProcess", at least there the bots are neutered enough to be absolutely useless... (there's additional functionality in the bot, but it seems the C2 that i have has no UI to send those packets lol)
> So, exploitation: (1) connect to C2. (2) send initial (system info) packet, this includes OS info string (we provide the string sent for "unknown OS" here), and CPU info (number of CPUs + CPU speed), we provide the specs of the highest-range Ryzen Threadripper here, because we can. (3) wait for packet 6 (start ddos) to be sent to us. (4) send our evil packet 3. (5) ??? (6) C2 killed :)
It's an interesting point that malware is typically poorly developed, but not sure what the point of this research is.
