I think that hardware-effect attacks are going to be the primary thorn in our side for the next few decades, even if we all agree to switch to object-capability systems immediately.
Also, both hardware and software could be hardened through formal verification. Usually the focus is software, but given the recently exposed flaws, hardware verification seems sorely needed.
Standardizing on ECC memory and encrypted memory would help. Looks like encrypted memory is happening on all new x86 business-focused processors, but ECC is still far too uncommon which means RowHammer is still an issue.
And greatly simplified instruction sets would help, but that is probably the least likely to happen.
Yeah... but that only works by you verifying your assumptions. If your assumptions are wrong, you remain screwed. I'm all for it but it's not perfection.
"The second thing to note here is that if you have a true capability system and can carefully control network access, then the capability to exfiltrate (basically to use fetch), can itself be treated as a critical permission. Secrets might be discovered but not as easily shared"
which is a very interesting point.
