@matthew_d_green twitter feed has a regular stream of high-quality Signal commentary.
[1] https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/06/new-e...
[2] https://twitter.com/signalapp/status/1262844332278603777
I must say its preferable for plain old SMS messaging, if nothing else, for the options it offers and the stable sane behavior.
The rest are linked from here[2].
[1]: https://www.eff.org/pages/secure-messaging-scorecard
[2]: https://www.eff.org/de/deeplinks/2018/03/secure-messaging-mo...
> EFF previously used to have a scorecard[1] for all the messaging applications, but they reconsidered the model of their recommendation
[1]:https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/986277159252750336?s=20
[2]:https://signal.orgAs always, it depends on the threat model...
Anyone want to explain where Signal fails for top level spying and Nation States are coming after you?
And what the safer alternative is?
My point is if you are concerned that the government is monitoring your communications (presumably related to the protests), then electronic methods are not reliable. Even if the encryption is solid, they could start jamming the frequencies used.
In the 2000s, drug dealers figured out that Nextel direct connect weren't tracable... so Nextel kiosks sprung up in the hood and you'd see them all over. After that, prepaid burners were the next thing, followed by BlackBerry, etc.
If your organizing protests in such a way that are going to attract surveillance, "Use X" is dumb advice. It depends on the situation and what consequences you can sustain. An activist may want to be arrested. A Federal employee may sacrifice their career just for being present. Context matters, but the smart path is to leave your phone at home.