I was genuinely looking for a logically consistent framework for excluding "insulting Trump supporters" from being an example of hate speech. I'm sorry if it seemed like I was labouring the point too much by asking where the lines around hate speech should be drawn.

I accept that there are objective historical examples of majority groups persecuting minority groups, and I'll ignore the difficulties of constructing well-defined subsets of a population (e.g. "working class") or whether a given group is numerically a minority (e.g. "females" in many countries). What I still think is subjective, though, is how much (and what sort of) persecution is necessary before a group becomes entitled to claim that hateful language used against them is "hate speech".

Imagine a hypothetical African country that had, say, France as its colonial occupier, under an apartheid system, but then allowed free elections, leading to the native population gaining political power. If the native population had talked about "getting rid of" their French occupiers, while the apartheid system was in place, presumably your definition of "hate speech" wouldn't have applied to that speech. But would your definition also not apply to similar speech (targeted at the same French people) after the occupying minority population lost their power? Would some amount of time (and violence) have to pass before the minority was entitled to point out that the hateful speech directed towards them was this special kind of "hate speech"?

Again, I apologise if this seems like a contrived example (and it's very hard to come up with an example that people don't have instinctive pre-conceptions and biases around), but I'm trying to explore if your definition really is as neutral as you think it is. You're right, though, that terms like "free speech" can be very nebulous, while still being useful concepts.