And even for well-known domains, https://www.xn--80ak6aa92e.com/ (currently still works in Firefox) is an excellent example of why domain validation remains completely useless.
[1] https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/20/technology/business/equifax...
This is one of the older controversies on m.d.s.policy, for whatever it's worth to you.
I don't really care where you or anyone else comes down on this, as long as we all agree that you can't just jettison certificates and let HTTPS "just provide encryption", which is a common HN refrain and is clearly unsound reasoning.
How is it that this still works in Firefox? It's been fixed for years in all other major browsers. I'm seriously shocked that Firefox still allows IDN homograph attacks.
TLS protects you from active attacker at your internet cafe wifi or small ISP or not-tier1 country's ministry of propaganda.
If the network between multiple aws/gcp/azure regions where e.g. let's encrypt's acme servers are deployed and the server you're talking to is hijacked, TLS doesn't help because hijacker can get valid certificate.