A little scary?
From what I understand, MCAS is a reasonable solution. Where it gets questionable is in not informing the pilots of this new system (but again, there were reasons for that, maybe as it turns out not good reasons), allowing the new system to override the yoke input (Boeing reasoned there was already a procedure for runaway trim pilots would follow), and keying the new system off a single AoA sensor and only having two AoA sensors total so it’s not clear what to do when they disagree.
Putting a longer undercarriage on an airplane is not a trivial matter. You have to design it, test it, get it certified (a new undercarriage raises obvious safety issues) and put it into production. It's not just the undercarriage - it won't fit into the existing wheel wells, and furthermore, the legs might have to be moved further out on the wing, and then you have to rework that, as well.
Perhaps, but it’s not unprecedented. The B2 stealth bomber, for example, famously lacks a vertical stabilizer (tail fin) and so is inherently unstable and relies on computerized control surfaces to maintain stable flight [1].
This seems to have worked fine, although the things definitely log way fewer flight hours than an airliner. I believe several other aircraft do this as well (fighter jets and such).
Still, the idea of it would give me the willies if I were in charge of flying one.
[1]: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_B-2_Spirit#...
One could see, though, how a Boeing engineer could point to the B2 and fighters that rely on software for safe flight and say “See? They do it and it’s fine!” as a justification. Not that I’m saying that makes it right.
https://www.quora.com/How-are-inherently-unstable-aircraft-s...
edit: oops someone already said this 30min ago