This always seemed like an incredibly toxic decision to me. It's one that crops up in all sorts of systems, large and small. What, none of these people /ever/ foresaw the need to delete some data?
HDFS, S3 and other systems have immutability in-built. Immutability is not bad per-se, as it give (some) assurance that data has not been tampered with, and although it could be implemented, the system cost could be significant.
Stricking the right balance is the challenge
> ...(unless) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;
It's a performance trade off, and not a very surprising one. Hard Disk Drives have always been known to never actually delete data (if you want the data gone, you overwrite it with 0s). It's not unimaginable that this performance trade-off found its way up the stack.
And just like a regular HDD, you can forcibly delete the data, it's just a very expensive operation that isn't needed 95% of the time.
Except apparently not, because the linked article is literally saying it's not supported.
I get wanting an audit trail, and I get wanting to not delete data if you don't have to for performance reasons, but neither of those things is the same as saying "it's literally not possible to delete stuff".
Sibling comments mention a cunning scheme with encryption, but that doesn't really help an enterprise with an existing non-GDPR-compliant backup archive.
This might be useful: http://www.davidfroud.com/does-right-to-erasure-include-back...
At least, that’s what I heard about how a BigCo is doing GDPR.
Anyway, think about the spirit of the law, and then think about how that interacts with backups. If someone asks to be deleted from your system, you do so, and then you restore a backup with their data, you have clearly violated the intent.
How exactly do you "forget" the data on the logs?
One interesting solution that kills two birds with one stone is if you encrypt the personally identifiable information then delete the private key if there is a request to be forgotten. Has the added benefit of also effectively destroying the data in backup copies too.
If we think around the options, you can have either:
i) eventual deletion (log retention policy) ii) compacted topics (and push null values) iii) expensive re-processing of the entire log iv) expensive segment re-write operation
with each option bringing in a new set of challenges
We've just hacked your server and wiped the crypto keys for your users. As you know, all your backups are now useless.
Send us $1 million in Bitcoin to get your crypto keys back.
Sincerely,
Hacker McHackface
"Simpler rules on cookies: the cookie provision, which has resulted in an overload of consent requests for internet users, will be streamlined. The new rule will be more user-friendly as browser settings will provide for an easy way to accept or refuse tracking cookies and other identifiers. The proposal also clarifies that no consent is needed for non-privacy intrusive cookies improving internet experience (e.g. to remember shopping cart history) or cookies used by a website to count the number of visitors."[0]
To answer your question "do we need to get consent from users before we can set any cookies?"
It depends: yes for tracking cookies, no for others. How to tell them apart is another question..
0. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPrivacy_Regulation_(European_...
https://github.com/snowplow/snowplow/issues/3472
For later phases, yes user-specific encryption of PII or hashing-with-lookup table are the way to go...
These approaches may help with compliance, but they’re the opposite of real safety.