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0 pointsgtcode8y ago0 comments

No, that's not true, the argument for a backdoor isn't purely technical. LE's perspective is almost certainly predicated on a universal (amongst the good) desire to reduce suffering. This part is downplayed or ignored.

Can you prove that there is no such thing as a "perfect" backdoor? Can you show that the existence of a skeleton key introduces risk beyond losing the key? Has this been formally proven?

That might be a good starting point, and I apologize if my understanding is wrong, but can't one build a skeleton key into encryption that cannot be broken with any greater likelihood than otherwise would be possible by compromising the encryption itself? If the surface area of attack is doubled at most, that seems a viable trade-off. Yes, it's potentially a huge SPOF if designed sub-optimally (I'd suspect that there is a way to build something akin to a one-time use set of segregated skeleton keys), but that risk needs management like all risks.

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Stefan-H8y ago

"Can you show that the existence of a skeleton key introduces risk beyond losing the key?" The fact that losing the key is a possibility is risk enough. Once PFS is implemented, the only way (barring crypto attacks) you can break an TLS session secured with it is to have compromised the systems at the time of the communication. A skeleton key now means that there is a possibility of offline decryption with just having a copy of the communication and the skeleton key. This key is handled by humans now, instead of machines and a protocol. That is far more than double the attack surface area.

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0 pointsgtcode8y ago0 comments

Can you prove that there is no such thing as a "perfect" backdoor? Can you show that the existence of a skeleton key introduces risk beyond losing the key? Has this been formally proven?

(redact)

0 comments

Stefan-H8y ago

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