Older child boy, younger child boy
Older child boy, younger child girl
Older child girl, younger child boy
Older child girl, younger child girl
Of those only one is precluded by saying (at least) one child is a boy.Oh well, I guess this is what the article is talking about :)
Assuming a coin-flip probability for boy/girl distribution, you get the 1/3 answer if we select for two-child families where at least one child is a boy: [(B,B), (B,G), (G,B)]. If we don't pre-select for having at least one boy, (i.e. if we select the family because we just met the father socially), the probability rises to 1/2, because we have two cases to consider, each with a 1/2 probability: [(B,B), (B,G)], and [(B,B), (G,B)].
He didn't ask ... what's the sex of the second child? No ... he asked ...
p(boys = 2 | boy >= 1) == p(child = boy)
Choosing a distribution that involves both children in this case is wrong, hence my answer that ordering doesn't matter. 33% is just wrong.Suppose I roll two dice until at least one of them shows a 6. What's the odds of both being 6's? I've said nothing about the red die versus the blue die, but the underlying truth requires that the situations are kept separate. It's only - as far as we know - in quantum mechanics where you deliberately lose the distinction.
I've done these as real world experiments as I explore them with kids, and I have a lot of direct experience. If you disagree then I'd be delighted to gamble with you.
You haven't read the article then ... the problem as stated in the article is that you know one coin is going to be a head, so what's the probability of the other one also being a head?
Of course ... the events aren't connected ... the second coin toss doesn't depend in any way on the first coin.
That's why I think there's something wrong about the article ... saying that the probability is 33% fails both intuition and elementary probabilistic.