Does anyone have any recommendations of other open source CRMs?
https://suitecrm.com/index.php?option=com_easyblog&view=entr...
For non-profits/associations, check out CiviCRM.org.
Yes. A button that attempts to remove XSS payloads from the database that admins can click. That's the level of security competence we are talking about here.
Edit: Here is the button: http://i.imgur.com/hC9KmWh.png
Maybe programming languages should have a minimum engineering and architectural design competence test such that required knowledge is assured before releasing craptacular poo upon the world.
(If you're write a SugarCRM sploit, obviously patch the Remove XSS to skip yourself.)
Basically this controlled whether authentication was always applied or not - by default it was kind of optional.
(b) If* the button really performs as advertised, why on earth should it be a manual step? Do it automatically.
(c) Best practice here is to escape-on-output, negating the need to remove in-DB XSS, so the fact that this button exists strongly implies they aren't doing that
* I would guess that the button is very unlikely to perform comprehensively as advertised
What happens if we view the admin panel and trigger one of these malicious scripts, because I haven't clicked this button recently enough? Oh, maybe someone should click it very frequently!
Or... Hmm, maybe rather than storing data that may be mass deleted by a script, with no review, after possibly compromising our security, we should just reject it in the first place and log a security incident for that user.
The comic compares running McAfee Antivirus on a voting machine to a teacher wearing a condom to work every day; "Strictly speaking, it's better than the alternative--yet someone clearing is doing their job horribly wrong."
A sharp knife will just cut the thing.
A dull/less sharp knife will not cut, causing you to add more pressure, causing the knife to slip, which is when you're more likely to cause yourself harm.
It is overwhelming how sweet is to read focused on the content instead on closing the next-to-scam popups that decides to open up on a random part of the article.
One interesting side effect of reader mode is that as all content has the same format, you get used very fast to compare content not based on external artifacts (font, colors, page layout), but in the actual message.
https://developer.sugarcrm.com/2017/04/17/use-of-prepared-st...
Hopefully Sugar will come forward with a response to these allegations because these are serious security risks.
Not quite, string concat for defining queries is still plenty vulnerable regardless of PDO.
The two bugs linked were both fixed around 10 years ago. If you're running PHP v4.4, your problems are basically infinite. It would be nice to make a clearer distinction between PHP problems and SugarCRM problems.
Using the unserialize() PHP function itself is not security issue, unless you use it with user-supplied input, and that's the reason why this is a SugarCRM problem and not a PHP problem.
Many open core solutions (I'm thinking of gitlab, but there are probably many other) fixes bugs in both versions.
Why don't they hmac the payloads (with a timestamp and something tied to the user (an ID, the username, whatever)) and verify the hmac before deserializing?Verifying an hmac prevents undetected tampering, is fast, and there are libraries for it in ~every language.
[0] http://techblog.procurios.nl/k/n618/news/view/34972/14863/ca...
Based on impact and reach, none of the vulnerabilities in in the second section scored higher than 'medium'... It’s important to note that updates based on issues scored as ‘medium’ are no longer provided to our last-generation open source Community Edition (CE), so the bloggers post no longer aligns with our current commercial products and solutions.
So, I just replied to their blog post with this comment (awaiting moderation, so will probably never be published):
Hi Rich, I'd like to know more about your latest update, the one with regards to the second section of my post: you're saying you rated all of the vulnerabilities I reported with a "medium" CVSS score (which version btw? v3.0?). However, I reported two SQL injection vulnerabilities and according to your security advisories (https://www.sugarcrm.com/security/sugarcrm-sa-2016-003 and https://www.sugarcrm.com/security/sugarcrm-sa-2017-001), in the past you rated SQL injection vulnerabilities in SugarCRM with 'High' or 'Important' risk level... May I know why now they're considered of 'Medium' risk level? They same applies to the remaining vulnerabilities, which might allow a malicious user to execute arbitrary PHP code, and so far in your security advisories this kind of issues has been rated with 'Critical' risk level (like this: https://www.sugarcrm.com/security/sugarcrm-sa-2016-001)... The numbers don't add up!
We gave up after a week (ended up building the thing in Django). vTiger/SugarCRM is most likely the worst PHP codebase still in active development/production.
Marketcircle for example has never been able to offer reliable SSL support for its CalDAV / CardDAV server. And they are switching to a cloud solution too – closed source and proprietary …
Currently we are considering odoo but any advice appreciated. https://comparisons.financesonline.com/sugar-crm-vs-odoo