The UK is a very divided place, as much as I don't like brexit (I think it is an exceptionally stupid move) I don't see the UK healing itself in time for this to be averted and the unanimous condition attached to any kind of revocation of Article 50 leaves very little room for hope.
May is on the record as saying that if there is no 'good deal' then there will be 'no deal', which is absolutely terrible for the UK, it's a game of continental chicken which will have only losers.
If the UK attempts to withdraw before negotations start then I give that some chance but if they first try to go through two years of negotiations and then attempt to withdraw as the deadline looms chances are very slim that they would be allowed to remain without serious concessions.
> against what the rest of EU media and politicians are saying
I've been paying a very close eye to this so I'm confused, what sources are authoritatively stating that A50 can't be revoked? Your Supreme Court piece does not cover it. In the UK, the only reason why some politicians say A50 can't be revoked is out of a concern for how it could play into negotiations. It's not a commentary on whether A50 is revokable or not. If the EU say it's not, it isn't. And the European Parliament's official stated position is that it is revokable. And even if it wasn't the stated position, the UK would still be able to argue it on legal grounds.
> I don't see the UK healing itself in time for this to be averted
I don't think healing would be the needed element, rather it would be the overriding desire to avoid further division and pain. More division and pain are on the menu. Given how far positions have changed in a year, it would be terribly unwise to underestimate the degree to which the landscape can change in the next 2 years.
Pre-referendum leave voters were optimistic about the economic future. That's trending down.
Pre-referendum nobody was factoring in a Trump presidency and how it might affect the UK's place in the world.
Pre-referendum the vast majority of MPs in Parliament were pro-remain, something which was not reflected in post-referendum votes in Parliament (which is to say attitudes shifted and can shift again).
To me the most significant repercussion of A50 having now been initiated is the fact that all those MPs that felt bound to submit to a plebiscite vote now may feel free again to act with the national interest in mind, given that they can say that they have dutifully observed the will of the electorate. In other words, the power of the referendum vote diminishes by the day.
Imagine if one or two major factories close down in leave areas, or if investment is shrunk down in light of Brexit with major job losses as a result. This could easily swing public opinion. With the cost of living going up, this next 2 years is going to be a true pressure cooker for the Government.
So have I. The only thing that has changed as far as I can see is that in the last couple of hours (and that's something I wasn't aware of when this thread came up) a number of politicians have said that they will propose a way for article 50 to be formally withdrawable. Up to now the status is that once article 50 has been triggered after 2 years, deal or no deal the separation is a fact and that there is no way back from that.
Any kind of suggestion that things are different ignores the actual text of article 50. The waters have been muddied a bit by the original author saying (but the bill not stating) that he meant for it to be withdrawable but I find that claim dubious, the only reason article 50 was drawn up in the first place was to allow for a way to exit the EU that nobody ever figured would be triggered at all.
Brexit took a lot of people (including the 'leave' camp) by surprise.
> And the European Parliament's official stated position is that it is revokable. And even if it wasn't the stated position, the UK would still be able to argue it on legal grounds.
Yes, they say that now. But that wasn't their position so far and these things have been made fairly clear. Again, my suspicion is that the impression so far was that the UK would not go so far as to actually trigger article 50, now that that has been done there is a substantial moving of the goalposts in order to allow the UK a way out. How they use that will be a big factor in whether or not the unanimous vote required to allow the UK to do so will be cast.
> I don't think healing would be the needed element, rather it would be the overriding desire to avoid further division and pain.
Judging by the comment sections of the various UK publications that desire is a long way off.
> Given how far positions have changed in a year, it would be terribly unwise to underestimate the degree to which the landscape can change in the next 2 years.
But they've gotten worse, not better, if this trend continues there is no way things will work out in favor of remain.
> Pre-referendum leave voters were optimistic about the economic future. That's trending down.
This is not my impression. My impression is that leave voters tend to downplay the economical impact of this and somehow believe that the UK as an independent entity will do a lot better because of 'all the money that goes to the EU'. Check out the comment threads under some of the articles linked here.
I suspect that thinking that people will come to their senses is one of the reasons the brexit vote happened the way it did in the first place.
> Pre-referendum nobody was factoring in a Trump presidency and how it might affect the UK's place in the world.
This seems to have emboldened the leave camp rather than weakened it.
In fact, there is something to say for Trump thanking his presidency to a similar emboldening of the pro Trump camp on the other side of the Atlantic. If brexit can happen anything can happen.
> Pre-referendum the vast majority of MPs in Parliament were pro-remain, something which was not reflected in post-referendum votes in Parliament (which is to say attitudes shifted and can shift again).
That's why there was a referendum in the first place. If it had been up to the MPs this would have never happened, they could see the economic impact a lot clearer than what you might be able to write on the side of a bus.
> To me the most significant repercussion of A50 having now been initiated is the fact that all those MPs that felt bound to submit to a plebiscite vote now may feel free again to act with the national interest in mind, given that they can say that they have dutifully observed the will of the electorate. In other words, the power of the referendum vote diminishes by the day.
That's wishful thinking. The referendum should never have been kept in the first place, now that it has been kept and a prime minister has made steps to withdraw the UK out of the EU they should start planning on how to run the country as an entity independently from the EU, anything less would be (another instance of) dereliction of duty. They were free to observe and to ignore the will of electorate in the past. That they did not do so has nothing to do with what's good for the UK or for their electorate, it only has to do with their own re-election.
The question then becomes: how fast will the economic situation deteriorate prior to an actual withdrawal, the more the better to illustrate what is to come after and maybe that will get people to realize this isn't all fun and games. But for now the 'wait-and-see' approach to this probably means that even though everybody will have a play-book on how to deal with the post brexit situation the majority of the parties will wait until very late in the process to move their assets and operations out of the UK, which will go a long way towards masking any of the real effects.
Of course the 'brexit' camp will paint that as fearmongering.
> Imagine if one or two major factories close down in leave areas, or if investment is shrunk down in light of Brexit with major job losses as a result.
Yes, it will. But until things are looking un-avoidable this will not happen. And by the time it is un-avoidable it is by definition too late. And when they do move it won't be just two major factories, it will be a whole slew of them in the space of a few months at the end of 2018 or thereabouts, for those that can move in two years. For others it may be later but at significantly higher costs (Nissan and BMW for instance).
> This could easily swing public opinion.
Public opinion is a dangerous thing to count on, that much should be clear from this whole exercise.
> With the cost of living going up, this next 2 years is going to be a true pressure cooker for the Government.
Yes. The problem I have with all this is that this triggering of article 50 should not have happened. That's a dangerous line to cross which puts the direction of the play in the hands of others. It is the beginning of the slide down and where that slide will end is anybody's guess. It's a bit like the Trump administration (forgive me, the UK has a much better functioning government than the United States at the moment but I think there are some parallels): making bold moves looks impressive because there is a lot of action, but longer term effects are far more important than the short term impression. Triggering article 50 to pander to the 'brexit' camp ('the will of the electorate') puts the UK in a very awkward position, if not followed through it allows the other side of the negotiation table to strengthen their position by simply waiting.
It also raises the expectations in the leave camp that brexit will actually happen.
Taking that away again could get ugly very quickly.
In order of preference: don't do that referendum, don't trigger article 50, don't exit the EU.
So we're one step closer to an actual exit, not one step closer to having this mess resolved in a way where all parties involved understand which side their bread is buttered on.
Added afterwards: In my opinion the whole brexit thing is powered by a yearning for things past, the time when the UK was an independent world power. So now a bunch of politicians (Johnson, Farage and others) have decided that they would rather be a big fish in a small pond than a medium sized fish in a much bigger pond. What they don't seem to realize is that on the world stage the UK really doesn't move the needle any more and that the strength of the EU lies in its unity and that the UK already had one of the best deals possible. These politicians will end up getting what they want and the 'leave' voters won't know how bad things really are until it is too late, but until then will be stuck in their convictions.
One thing you can be 100% sure of: any effects of brexit felt prior to the actual thing will in that camp be determined to be the fault of the EU, never the fault of the brexit voters.
- the draft resolution confirming that the EU endorses the possibility of revocation is consistent with noises made by EU politicians well in advance of the A50 notification. Tusk said it very clearly back in October (1). At the same time there are no EU sources that I know of that have suggested otherwise.
- The 'deal or no deal' rhetoric underlines the disadvantage of the UK in coming to a deal in a fixed time frame. It is not underlining the impossibility of aborting the withdrawal. This is more about how the UK will not be able to draw out exit negotiations in its favour while holding the EU hostage. Revocation is an advantage to the EU because at the end of the day, keeping the UK in the EU is still going to be a better than any other scenario on the table - money talks and without the UK EU members have a lot of unwanted budgeting pressures to sort out.
> But they've gotten worse, not better, if this trend continues there is no way things will work out in favor of remain.
I think evaluating the comment sections of publications is a very poor way to assess public opinion for a variety of reasons. This is why we have properly conducted surveys and surveys show that pre-referendum attitudes have shifted.
In the aggregate people are more pessimistic about the economic future, even leave voters. In my prior link you will find that its trending very steadily in one direction. Remember that leave voters pre-referendum by and large were working under the premise that Brexit would not have any personal cost attached to it. Surveys taken before the referendum have illustrated this. Another attitude highlighted in surveys that show that when leave voters are prompted how much money they would be willing to surrender in order to accomplish Brexit's stated goals, most leave voters balk (2). True public support for hard brexit (under no deal or under no customs union + no single market membership) is not strong at all and projected to get weaker as pressure builds around the economy and continued cuts and public service failures.
> Public opinion is a dangerous thing to count on, that much should be clear from this whole exercise.
Which is exactly the point. A government is helped having public opinion on its side, I'm saying shifts in attitude are already undermining future support for the way the UK pursues Brexit. None of the stated benefits of Brexit are due to unfold in the next 5 years and that realisation is not going unnoticed. We know there's no additional 350 million for the NHS being budgeted. We know there will be no trade deal in 2 years. We know that immigration is not going to be artificially cut. Deals with India and the US are a very long way of and if they transpire, they likely won't be good deals.
And I would argue that public support for the Brexit pursued by the UK currently never was very strong, even at its peak. The 'leave' vote got a majority because it was able to group public support for incompatible goals. Now the public finds out that most of those goals, if any at all, will come to pass or turn out to be an illusion (such as the supposed increase in sovereignty) public opinion only has one way to go.
I'm more bullish on the odds of Brexit being aborted now than at any point before. I still think the odds are low, but they are much better than they were before. I know the British press is going to interpret A50 as being the nail in the coffin for EU membership, but it's not a difficult analysis to come to the contrary position:
The only thing that has been predictable so far is the government doing a poor job at preparation, execution and thinking steps ahead. Every step of the way it's making strategic, tactical mistakes and fumbling on policy. It's the one thing we can count on. The odds of a deal being done in 24 months are slim in part because of this. And if there is no deal in time, 650 MPs will have to think hard a simple choice: it can green light a national disaster brought onto it by itself, or it can intervene.
It was politically tough to oppose the A50 notification because it will be regarded as subverting a democratic result. Inside of 2 years time, it will be at least as politically damaging to not intervene in a national disaster. And MPs that have blessed the notification now can credibly oppose government performance on Brexit while being inoculated against the charge that they are subverting the will of an electorate.
What are the odds that the government negotiates a good deal or any deal at all? They are not that good at all, just given all the things that are outside the control of the UK. The momentous act of revoking the withdrawal - while unthinkable now - will look like the better option down the line. EU's history is full of members changing their minds. All it takes is for the UK government to be consistent with past performance and do a poor job at what is the toughest project it has ever undertaken since WW2. There are other plausible outcomes, but Brexit is nowhere near as avoidable as most think.
But let there be no mistake, this whole is a gigantic mess no matter how it unfolds.
1) http://blogs.ft.com/david-allen-green/2016/10/18/can-an-arti... 2) http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/hard-brexit-only-if...
